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Reducing the Price of Peace:
The
Human
Rights
Responsibilities of Third-Party
Facilitators
Michal Saliternik*

ABSTRACT
Peace agreements can bring about serious injustices. For
example, they may establish oppressive regimes, provide for the
transfer of populations, or allocate natural resources in an
inequitable manner. This Article argues that third-party
facilitators-statesand internationalorganizations that act as
mediators, donors,
or peacekeepers-should have
a
responsibility to prevent such injustices. While the primary duty
to ensure the justice of peace agreements resides with the
governments that negotiate and sign them, directing regulation
efforts only at those governments may prove insufficient in
protecting human rights under the politically constrained
circumstances of peacemaking. It is therefore necessary to
complement the primary duties of negotiators with the
secondary duties of facilitators, who can afford to contemplate
long-term justice and sustainability considerations and often
have considerable influence on negotiatordecisions.
This Article presents a novel theory of sovereign authority
that provides a normative basis for holding facilitators
responsible to help prevent peace-related injustices. In
accordance with this theory, the governments of all the world's
countries should collectively bear the responsibility for ensuring
the compatibility of peace agreements with human rights norms.
Peace facilitators, however, should be singled out to discharge
this collective responsibility in view of their potential
contribution to peace injustices and their special ability to
prevent them. This Article explores ways to translatefacilitator
responsibilities into concrete legal obligations. The potential
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Conditions, Faculty of Law, University of Haifa. Ph.D, Tel Aviv University Faculty of
Law. I am grateful to Eyal Benvenisti, Megan Donaldson, Eldar Haber, Benedict
Kingsbury, Christopher McCrudden, Faina Milman-Sivan, and Ariel Porat for their
insightful comments and advice.
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contribution of such obligations to promoting just and
sustainablepeace is demonstrated through a critical analysis of
the treatment of justice issues in past peace negotiations in
Bosnia, SierraLeone, and Afghanistan.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The idea that peace agreements can bring about serious
injustices is somewhat counterintuitive. Everyone knows that "peace
has a price" and that it may involve painful compromises, but few
would connect such compromises with human rights violations or
other serious forms of wrongdoing. Admittedly, the injustices that
result from peace agreements are usually less severe than the
injustices of the wars that they seek to end. Present-day peace
agreements no longer include devastating arrangements that brutally
infringe on human life or dignity, for example by endorsing slavery.'
However, contemporary peace agreements can still undermine justice
principles and human rights norms in a variety of ways. For example,
they can prescribe the establishment of an exclusionary or oppressive
regime, provide for the transfer of populations, allocate natural
resources in an inequitable manner, or fail to, adequately address
human rights violations that took place during the conflict. In

1.
Slavery-promoting peace agreements were apparently quite common until
the eighteenth century. For example, in the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), which ended a
series of wars in Europe, Britain was granted a monopoly on the slave trade from
Africa to the Spanish colonies in America. See Patricia M. Muhammad, The TransAtlantic Slave Trade, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 883, 911 (2004). In another type of
slavery-supporting peace agreements, colonial governments granted recognition to
rebel slave communities in exchange for the latter's assistance in capturing new
runaway slaves and returning them to their owners. See Bryan Edwards, Observations
on the Maroon Negroes of the Island of Jamaica, in MAROON SOCIETIES: REBEL SLAVE
COMMUNITIES IN THE AMERICAS 230, 238 (Richard Price ed., 3d ed. 1996); R.K. Kent,
Palmares: an African State in Brazil, in MAROON SOCIETIES: REBEL SLAVE
COMMUNITIES IN THE AMERICAS 170, 184 (Richard Price ed., 3d ed. 1996).
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addition to the contents of peace agreements, the processes through
which they are achieved can also be plagued with representation
deficits, biased or corrupt decision making, and other justice
problems.
While the final decision of whether to adopt an injurious
arrangement or pursue shady negotiation procedures belongs to the
government or quasi-governmental entity that negotiates and signs
the peace agreement, that decision is often influenced by various
incentives
that third-party facilitators-states,
international
organizations, and other actors that are involved in peace processes
as mediators, donors, or peacekeepers-provide, or refrain from
providing, to the negotiating parties. To give a few examples: In the
negotiations that led to the Dayton Agreement on Bosnia, the U.S.
government used military and economic incentives to induce the
negotiating parties to cooperate with international criminal
proceedings and to facilitate refugee return. The U.S. government
thereby promoted justice considerations; however, it also supported
exclusionary power-sharing arrangements that the European Court
of Human Rights later deemed to violate human rights norms.2 In the
Bonn peace talks on Afghanistan, the United Nations made sure to
invite representatives from all major Afghan ethnic, religious, and
geographic groups. But at the same time, the United Nations
accorded legitimacy to the exclusion of women from the talks.3 In
Sierra Leone, UN mediators endorsed power-sharing arrangements
that assigned central governmental positions to murderous militia
leaders, yet they opposed the granting of blanket amnesty to the
same persons and took measures that paved the way for future
prosecution of militia leaders. 4 Looking to the future, in the midst of
the 2013-2014 U.S.-brokered Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, Israel's
Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that his basic condition for
supporting a peace agreement would be that its terms would include
the transfer of the Israeli "Triangle" area, which is densely populated
by Israeli Arab citizens, to the Palestinian state.5 Despite the
discriminatory nature of his statement, which sought to deprive
Israeli Arabs-an ethnic minority group-of their citizenship, the
U.S. government remained silent. It is hard to tell how the U.S.
government will react if a transfer of the Triangle is seriously
contemplated in future negotiations.

2.
See infra Part III.A.1.
3.
See infra Part III.B.
4.
See infra Part III.C.
5.
See Barak Ravid, Lieberman: Several Israeli Arab Towns Must Be Made
Part of Palestine Under Peace Deal, HAARETZ (Jan. 5, 2014, 10:23 AM),
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/1.567063 [http//perma.ceF65W-GEUWJ
(archived Oct. 2, 2014) (quoting the Minister of Foreign Affairs' statement: "This is not
a transfer. Nobody will be expelled or banished, but the border will move").
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This Article argues that international law should recognize the
responsibility of third-party facilitators, like the United States and
the United Nations, to prevent peace-related injustices. It presents a
novel theoretical framework for establishing and developing this
responsibility. The heart of this framework is human sovereignty, a
humanity-oriented conceptualization of the principle of state
sovereignty. The theoretical framework asserts that governments
bear a primary duty to promote the well-being of their citizens and, at
the same time, also a secondary duty to promote the well-being of
non-citizens if the non-citizens' own governments are unable or
unwilling to do so. Applied to the context of peacemaking, human
sovereignty requires that a government engaged in peace
negotiations would attempt to reach a just peace agreement that
reflects equal concern and respect for all its citizens. At the same
time, all the world's other governments-the "international
community" as a whole-should bear a secondary responsibility to
ensure that the negotiating government lives up to its duties toward
its citizens. However, since attributing such responsibility to the
international community is susceptible to collective action problems
that may lead to inaction, it is necessary to identify specific actors
within the international community who will have the major duty of
discharging this responsibility. This Article asserts that third-party
peace facilitators should be selected for this task in view of their
potential contribution to peace injustices and their special ability to
prevent them.
The theory of third-party facilitator responsibility put forward in
this Article thus recognizes that the main duty to prevent peace
injustices resides with the governments that negotiate and sign peace
agreements. However, this Article also assumes that to focus
of
politically-constrained
responsibilities
on
the
exclusively
governments seeking their way out of a bloody conflict may prove
inefficient in protecting affected interests. To fill this protection gap,
this Article establishes the complementary duties of third-party
facilitators, who can afford to contemplate long-term justice and
sustainability considerations, and who are often able to use
significant side-payments or sanctions to induce negotiators to adhere
to justice principles. As we will see, directing regulation efforts at
third-party facilitators is all the more crucial when the facilitators
implicitly or explicitly encourage negotiators to adopt injurious
arrangements or pursue exclusionary negotiation procedures that
they believe to be necessary for the consummation of peace.
Although this Article advocates heavier human rights duties of
facilitators toward the populations affected by peace agreements, it
acknowledges the need to balance these secondary duties against the
primary duties facilitators still have toward their own populations. It
also acknowledges the need to respect the self-determination of
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countries undergoing a transition from war to peace, as well as the
need to allow negotiators and facilitators sufficient maneuvering
space to find an agreed solution to the conflict. This Article suggests
that these conflicting considerations should be taken into account
when designing and applying international legal constraints to
peacemakers.
It is worth emphasizing that this Article is concerned with the
responsibility of third-party facilitators to ensure that their
assistance does not indirectly support or enable human rights
violations by the negotiating parties, as opposed to their duty not to
engage directly in such violations. The responsibility of third-party
facilitators to prevent human rights violations committed directly by
their agents is an important issue that is gaining increasing
attention, for example, in the context of sexual abuses of local women
by peacekeeping personnel. 6 However, the responsibilities that may
accrue to facilitators with respect to more remote, yet often
predictable and controllable, acts connected with their assistance
seem to involve particularly intriguing ethical and legal questions
that have so far not been addressed in a systematic manner. Filling
this scholarly gap is crucial for improving the justice and long-term
sustainability of peace agreements.
The question examined in this Article should also be
distinguished from the question of whether states should be required,
in the first place, to provide peace-facilitating services to other states
struggling to emerge from violent conflicts and who, among all the
world's states, should be singled out to discharge this collective
responsibility. Although the theory of human sovereignty developed
in this Article can be helpful also in answering this jus ad pacem
question, such an analysis involves various intricacies that cannot be
addressed within the present jus in pace inquiry. In any event,
establishing the very duty to assist countries in their quest for peace
does not seem to be such an urgent task, for, as shown in Part II,
there is currently no shortage of international peace-facilitating
services.
In presenting the case for peace facilitator responsibility, this
Article proceeds in seven parts. Part II sets the background for the
discussion by identifying the various types of third-party facilitator
actors, describing what functions they fulfill, and explaining their
motivations. Part III demonstrates the influence of facilitators on the

6.
See, e.g., Anna Shotton, A Strategy to Address Sexual Exploitation and
Abuse by United Nations Peacekeeping Personnel, 39 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 97 (2006)
(addressing sexual exploitation in peacekeeping operations); Olivera Simid, Does the
Presence of Women Really Matter? Towards Combating Male Sexual Violence in Peacekeeping
Operations, 17 INT'L PEACEKEEPING 188 (2010) (addressing sexual violence in
peacekeeping operations).
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human rights dimensions of peace agreements through an analysis of
past peace negotiations in Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Sierra Leone.
Part IV presents the human sovereignty concept as a plausible
normative ground for establishing and delineating the human rights
responsibilities of peace facilitators, and Part V discusses the
implications of this theoretical model for peace processes. Part VI
considers possible avenues for embedding facilitator responsibilities
in international legal doctrine. Part VII concludes.

II. PEACE FACILITATORS: WHO THEY ARE, WHAT THEY Do, AND WHY

THEY Do IT

Intensive third-party involvement is one of the hallmarks of
contemporary peace processes. Third parties usually provide the
principal parties (Parties)-the conflict's protagonists who negotiate a
peace agreement and undertake the main obligations under its
terms-with various services to support peacemaking efforts,
including mediation, financing, and peacekeeping. Whereas
mediators play a crucial role in the pre-agreement negotiation
process, the major activity of donors and peacekeepers takes place at
the
post-agreement
implementation
stage.
However,
their
contribution is often anticipated and counted on by the Parties
already at the negotiation stage, a fact which points to their potential
influence on negotiators' early choices regarding negotiation
procedures and peace terms.
A. Mediators
Mediators have taken part in the majority of peace negotiations
in the past century.7 The main task of a mediator is to help the
Parties reach an agreed solution to the conflict by facilitating a
constructive, integrative dialogue between them. Toward that aim,
the mediator may use a range of non-coercive strategies: she can try
to alter the Parties' perceptions about the conflict and its sources,
point out what the Parties stand to gain by ending it, suggest creative

7.

See, e.g., Jacob Bercovitch,

Mediation in International Conflicts, in

PEACEMAKING IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: METHODS AND TECHNIQUES 163, 169-170

(I. William Zartman ed., rev. ed. 2007) (highlighting the number of conflicts that have
been mediated); INT'L PEACE INSTITUTE, Mediation and Peace Processes:Task Forces on
Strengthening MultilateralSecurity Capacity: IPI Blue Paper no. 8, Oct. 9, 2009, at 6,
9, available at http://www.ipinst.org/publication/policy-papers/detail/273-mediationand-peace-processes-ipi-blue-paper-no-8.html [http://perma.ccl5LM6-NBFM] (archived
Oct. 2, 2014) (describing the increase in the use of mediators).
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solutions, and so forth.8 Not infrequently, however, mediators with
suitable capacities use more coercive mediation strategies, such as
the threat to use economic and even military sanctions.9 Moreover,
rather than merely suggesting possible solutions to the parties,
mediators sometimes take a proactive role in drafting and
formulating the peace agreement.
The majority of mediators are official representatives of
international organizations or third-party governments.' 0 The most
prominent mediators are the United Nations and the United States."
However, regional organizations such as the African Union, the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the
European Union, as well as small states like Switzerland, Norway,
Kenya, and Qatar, are also quite frequently involved in peace
mediation.' 2 Naturally, large and powerful mediators can employ a
greater range of means and incentives to exert influence upon the
parties than small states or organizations, which usually adopt a
more flexible-"low-profile"-mediation style.
In recent years, however, non-state actors have also increasingly
assumed mediation roles: most notably EU- and U.S.-based
transnational non-governmental organizations (NGOs). For instance,
the Carter Center, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, the Crisis
Management Initiative, and Conciliation Resources have been
involved in mediation efforts in countries as diverse as Ethiopia,
Sudan, Liberia, Azerbaijan, Philippines, Indonesia, and Cambodia.' 3
In other places, such as Mozambique and Colombia, religious
associations have played a crucial role in facilitating peace
negotiations.14

8.

For descriptions of the work of mediators and analyses of case studies, see

JACOB BERCOVITCH, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION (2011);
INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (Saadia Touval & I. William

Zartman eds., 1985).
9.
See, e.g., Cindy Daase, The Law of the Peacemaker: The Role of Mediators in
Peace Negotiations and Lawmaking, 1(3) CAMBRIDGE J. INT'L & COMP. L. 107, 112
(2012) (defining the manipulative mediator); Saadia Touval, Coercive Mediation on the
Road to Dayton, 1 INT'L NEG. 547 (1996) (discussing manipulative mediators in the
Bosnian conflict).
10.
See BERCOVITCH, supra note 8, at 23 (outlining the characteristics of
mediators).
11.
See SIMON J.A. MASON & DAMIANO ANGELO SGUAITAMATTI, ZURICH CENTER
FOR SECURITY STUDIES, MAPPING MEDIATORS: A COMPARISON OF THIRD PARTIES AND

IMPLICATIONS FOR SWITZERLAND 17-18, 21 (2011) (describing the involvement of the
United Nations and the United States).
12.
See id. at 20-21.
13.
For a detailed description of these organizations and their activities until
&

2008, see INITIATIVE FOR PEACEBUILDING, THE PRIVATE DIPLOMACY SURVEY 2008:
MAPPING 14 PRIVATE DIPLOMACY ACTORS IN EUROPE AND AMERICA (Antje Herrberg

Heidi Kumpulainen eds., 2008).
14.
See Philipp Kastner, Towards Internalized Legal Obligations to Address
Justice and Accountability? A Novel Perspective on the Legal Framework of Peace
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B. Donors
Peacemaking is an expensive business. The financial costs of
peace may include reconstruction of physical infrastructure, refugee
return
or
resettlement,
transitional
justice
mechanisms,
demobilization and reintegration of combatants, environmental
projects like building peace parks and developing shared natural
resources, peacekeeping missions, and the creation of socioeconomic
conditions that support sustainable peace through investment in
education, employment, and housing. Countries emerging from
violent conflicts cannot usually afford the expenses of peace.
International fundraising has therefore become a central component
of peace processes. 15 The most prominent donors are either wealthy
third-party states or international aid agencies like the World Bank
and the UN Development Programme.
Post-conflict financial assistance can provide important
incentives to the belligerent parties to end the conflict. "Providing a
bridge between emergency humanitarian relief and long-term
development," peace aid is "designed to persuade formerly warring
parties to resolve conflicts peacefully." 16 A common method for raising
peace-building funds is to convene a country-specific international
donor conference. Even though these conferences usually take place
only after negotiations have ended,' 7 the prospect of an external
peace dividend in the form of financial aid can provide ex ante
incentives to the Parties and induce them to contemplate donors'
expectations already during negotiations.' 8
C. Peacekeepers
The term "peacekeeping," which was once used exclusively to
describe ceasefire enforcement by international military missions, is
now commonly used to refer to a range of military and non-military
tasks fulfilled by third parties in the context of post-conflict

INTENTIONS: PLEDGES OF AID FOR POSTCONFLICT RECOVERY (Shephard Forman

&

Negotiations, 12 CRIM. L.F. 193, 195 (2012) (discussing the effect of religious
organizations on negotiations).
15.
See, e.g., Shephard Forman & Stewart Patrick, Introduction, in GOOD
Stewart Patrick eds., 2000) (noting that during the 1990s, the international community
pledged more than $100 billion in aid to three dozen countries emerging from violent
conflicts).
16.
Id. at 1.
17.
See, e.g., James A. Boyce, Beyond Good Intentions: External Assistance and
Peace Building, in GOOD INTENTIONS, supra note 15 at 367, 368 (comparing the
convening dates of donor conferences on Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique,
Palestine, and Bosnia). International donor conferences have also been held shortly
after the signing of peace agreements in Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan, Mozambique,
and elsewhere.
18.
See id. at 368 (discussing how aid pledges can provide incentives).

188

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 48:179

transitions.1 9 Under the broad definition of peacekeeping, which this
Article adopts, peacekeeping activities may include ceasefire
monitoring, preparation and control of national elections, verification
of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants
(DDR), training of police forces, and human rights monitoring.
Understood even more broadly, peacekeeping can encompass the
establishment and operation of adjudication or arbitration tribunals
and commissions dealing with conflict-related reparation claims or
with alleged violations of the peace agreement. Peacekeeping tasks
are usually specified in the terms of the peace agreement and are
considered a key aspect of its implementation.
As with other peace facilitation roles, the most salient provider of
peacekeeping services is the United Nations. Especially since the end
of the Cold War, the United Nations has established dozens of
multitask peacekeeping
missions. These include the UN
peacekeeping missions in Angola, which were mandated to monitor
national elections and to observe and verify the disarmament and
withdrawal of military forces. 20 Another significant UN peacekeeping
mission was that in C6te d'Ivoire, which was mandated to facilitate
the implementation of the 2003 Linas-Marcoussis Agreement by way
of, inter alia, supporting DDR and security sector reform processes,
protecting civilian population, and monitoring human rights
violations. 21
Regional organizations have also been engaged in peacekeeping
missions, often in cooperation with the United Nations. Notable
among them is the Economic Community of West African States
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), the permanent monitoring group
established by ECOWAS, which was involved in peacekeeping in
Liberia, Sierra Leone, and other countries. 22 Other peacekeeping
operations have been launched by multinational ad-hoc missions or
"contact groups," as in the case of the monitoring group set up to
oversee compliance with the 1996 Israeli-Lebanese Ceasefire
Understandings, which is comprised of representatives from the

19.

See,

ENCYCLOPEDIA

e.g., Michael
OF

PUBLIC

Bothe,

Peacekeeping,

INTERNATIONAL

LAw

¶1

1-16,

(Rildiger

in MAX PLANCK

Wolfrum

&

Frauke

Lachenmann eds., 2011) (exploring the term "peacekeeping").
20.
See S.C. Res. 696, U.N. Doc. S/RES/696 (May 30, 1991) (establishing a
peacekeeping mission in Angola); S.C. Res. 976, U.N. Doc. S/RES/976 (Feb. 8, 1995)
(establishing another peacekeeping mission in Angola); see also Manuel J. Paulo, The
Role of the United Nations in the Angolan Peace Process, 15 ACCORD 28 (2004)
(describing the different roles the United Nations played in Angola).
21.
See S.C. Res. 1528, U.N. Doc. SIRES/1528 (Feb. 27, 2004) (establishing a
peacekeeping mission in C6te d'Ivoire).
22.
See Bothe, supra note 19, ¶ 22 (highlighting the Economic Community of
West African States).
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United States, France, Syria, Lebanon, and Israel.23 Finally, the
Permanent Court of Arbitration has supported the operation of
several judicial and quasi-judicial post-conflict commissions, among
them are both the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission and the
Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission. The Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims
Commission was established pursuant to the 2000 Algiers Peace
Agreement with the mandate to decide all claims for loss, damage, or
injury submitted by Eritrea and Ethiopia against each other. 24 The
Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission was authorized under the
same agreement to demarcate the Eritrean-Ethiopian border. 2 5
Although not a common practice, implementation roles can also
be assigned to non-state actors. For example, the Dayton Agreement
prisoner exchange article provides that the International Red Cross
Commission (ICRC) will prepare and assist in the implementation of
a plan for the release and transfer of all prisoners. 26 The agreement
also assigns a role to the ICRC in the implementation of its refugee
and displaced person provisions.2 7
D. FacilitatorMotivations
Peace facilitators usually do their job voluntarily, despite having
no concrete legal duty to do so. It is quite obvious why international
and regional organizations that were created with the purpose of
promoting peace and security decide to engage in peace-facilitating
tasks. But why do individual states take upon themselves such tasks,
and bear their costs, instead of leaving them to international and
regional organizations that can distribute these costs among their
members? What benefits do states have to gain from undertaking
peace-facilitating roles?
First, acting as peace facilitators provides a state with the
opportunity to influence the terms of peace agreements in a manner

23.

See

ISR. MINISTRY

OF

FOREIGN

AFFAIRS,

Israel

Lebanon

Ceasefire

Understanding (Apr. 27, 1996), available at http://www.peacemaker.un.org/sites/
peacemaker.un.org/files/IL%20LB_960426_Israel-Lebanon%20Ceasefire%2oUnderstanding
.pdf [http://perma.cclLZD5-6KW5] (archived Sept. 28, 2014) (establishing the monitoring
group).
24.
Agreement for the Resettlement of Displaced Persons, as Well as
Rehabilitation and Peace Building in Both Countries, Eth.-Eri., art. 5, Dec. 12, 2000,
2138 U.N.T.S. 94, available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/4a54bbedO.html [http://
perma.cc/G3AN-XYGB] (archived Sept. 28, 2014).
25.
Id. art. 4.
26.
See Letter from Madeline F. Albright, Permanent Rep. of the U.S. to the
U.N., to Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Annex 1A, art. IX(1), U.N. Doc. S/1995/999 (Nov. 30,
1995), available at http://www.peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/BA
951121 DaytonAgreement.pdf [http://perma.cclNBH3-K4F9] (archived Sept. 29, 2014)
[hereinafter Dayton Agreement] (detailing the requirements for prisoner exchange).
27.
Id. Annex 7, arts. 111(2), V.
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that serves that state's particular interests, which may range from
strengthening economic relations with the Parties to suppressing
negative externalities entailed by war.2 8 Second, undertaking
mediation and other facilitation roles can help states gain general
international prestige,2 9 stand out as regional agenda-setters
(especially for small and medium-sized states), 30 or maintain a
dominant position in the global arena (especially for large states).31
Third, states may wish to contribute to the resolution of conflicts that
involve populations who have special ethnic or religious ties with
influential groups within their own country, in order to increase their
domestic power. 32 Finally, states may find non-selfish satisfaction in
the promotion of human welfare worldwide. 33
As far as NGO peace facilitators are concerned, such altruism, as
well as personal reputation concerns, appears to provide the main
drive for their activities. As we will see later,3 4 recognizing the
benefits that states draw from facilitating peace processes is
important for addressing a possible criticism against the recognition
of facilitators' human rights responsibilities, according to which such
recognition may deter them from offering help in the first place and
thus be detrimental to peace efforts.

28.
See BERCOVITCH, supra note 8, at 23 (explaining how states can be
influential through mediation); Saadia Touval, The Superpowers as Mediators, in
MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS:

MULTIPLE

APPROACHES

TO CONFLICT

&

MANAGEMENT 232 (Jacob Bercovitch & Jeffrey Z. Rubin eds., 1992) (illustrating why
superpowers Russia and the United States intervene using mediation); FOREIGN
COMMONWEALTH

OFFICE, DEP'T FOR INT'L DEV.

& MINISTRY OF DEF., BUILDING

STABILITY OVERSEAS STRATEGY 7-8 (2011) (U.K.) (detailing why global stability is
important to the interests of the United Kingdom).
29.

See JOHN L. HIRSCH, SIERRA LEONE: DIAMONDS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR

DEMOCRACY 81 (2001) (noting that the Togolese president was keen to broker the
Sierra Leonean peace process since he wanted to improve his dubious international
reputation).
30.
See MASON & SGUAITAMATTI, supra note 11, at 21-22 (describing the
advantages for smaller states to undertake mediation roles).
31.
See, e.g., Touval, supra note 28 (explaining advantages for superpowers).
32.
See MASON & SGUAITAMATTI, supra note 11, at 22 (suggesting that the
efforts by Malaysia to mediate the internal conflict in the Philippines and by Turkey to
mediate the nuclear crisis in Iran were significantly motivated by the desire of the
Malaysian and Turkish governments to gain popularity among their domestic Muslim
populations).
33.

See

STEPHEN

KRASNER,

INTERNATIONAL

REGIMES

13-15

(1983)

(distinguishing between the use of state power to enhance particular national interests
and the use of power to promote cosmopolitan ends).
34.
See infra Part V.D.II (discussing ways in which attributing human rights
duties to facilitators can undermine peace prospects).
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III. PEACE FACILITATORS AND JUSTICE CONSIDERATIONS IN BOSNIA,
SIERRA LEONE, AND AFGHANISTAN

To better understand how peace facilitators operate and to
appreciate their potential influence on negotiators with respect to
human rights and other justice issues, this Part examines three past
peace processes that raised serious procedural or substantive justice
concerns and analyzes how they were treated by facilitators. It shows
that in all three cases facilitator influence was Janus-faced:
facilitators helped prevent some peace-related injustices and ignored
or contributed to others. The cases of Bosnia, Sierra Leone, and
Afghanistan point to the need to regulate facilitator activity so as to
increase facilitators' motivations to mobilize their influence to
promote justice and human rights rather than undermine them.
A. Bosnia
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) is home to three major ethnic
groups-Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), Serbs, and Croats. These
groups make up about 44 percent, 31 percent, and 17 percent of the
entire population, respectively.3 5 For many years, the three groups
lived together in peace in mostly mixed communities. But as waves of
ethnic nationalism swept the former Yugoslavia, Bosnian inter-ethnic
coexistence quickly collapsed into a wholesale civil war.3 6 This war
lasted three years and eight months, and it was marked by genocide
and ethnic cleansing.
After several unsuccessful mediation attempts, the presidents of
Yugoslavia, Croatia, and Bosnia convened in a U.S. military base in
Dayton, Ohio, on November 1, 1995, to find an agreed solution to the
Bosnian conflict. The Dayton negotiations were formally co-chaired by
the United States, Russia, and the EU. In practice, however, the
negotiations were administered and controlled by the U.S.

35.
These data are based on the 1991 Yugoslav Population Census, which was
the last official census conducted in Bosnia until 2013. See Nesluibeni podaci o
strukturi stanovniitva predratne BiH [Yugoslav Population Census] (1991), available
at http://josip.purger.com/other/bihlindex.htm [http://perma.cclXZT7-FAB9] (archived
Sept. 29, 2014). In 2013, another official census was conducted. However, the final
results of this census have not yet been published. The preliminary results do not
include any data on ethnic affiliation. See AGENCY FOR STATISTICS OF BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA, PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF THE 2013 CENSUS OF POPULATION,
HOUSEHOLDS AND DWELLINGS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (2013), available at

http://www.bhas.balobavjestenja/Preliminarni-rezultati-bos.pdf [http://perma.cc/62X2BKPA] (archived Jan. 19, 2015).
36.
For general accounts of the Bosnian war and its background, see generally
NOEL MALCoLM, BOSNIA: A SHORT HISTORY (1996); STEVEN L. BURG & PAUL S. SHOUP,
THE WAR IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA:
ETHNIC CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL
INTERVENTION (1999).
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government. The U.S. government not only determined the timing
and location of the talks but also decided who would be invited to
participate and drafted many parts of the agreement down to the
smallest details.37 As the only superpower in the post-cold war era
and with its deep military and economic involvement in devastated,
war-torn Yugoslavia, the United States had considerable leverage
over the negotiating parties, which it did not hesitate to use in order
to induce the parties to make significant concessions and eventually
sign the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (Dayton Agreement).3 8
From a human rights perspective, the Dayton Agreement
included at least two problematic arrangements that were demanded
or approved by facilitators, one referring to power-sharing and the
other to refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). In addition,
the negotiation procedures were highly exclusionary and did not
allow for adequate representation of affected interests.
1.

Exclusionary Power-Sharing Arrangements

Annex 4 of the Dayton Agreement prescribes a new constitution
for Bosnia. Under this constitution, Bosnia is to become a
consociational
democracy
comprised
of two
entities:
the
(predominantly
Bosniak-Croat)
Federation
of Bosnia
and
Herzegovina, and the (predominantly Serb) Republika Srpska.3 9 The
constitution distinguishes between two kinds of Bosnian citizens,
namely, "constituent peoples" (Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats) on the
one hand, and "Others" (e.g., Roma and Jews) on the other hand. The
constitution provides that all seats in the three-member Presidency of
Bosnia and the fifteen-member House of Peoples (the vetoing
chamber of the Bosnian Parliamentary Assembly) shall be allocated
among the three constituent peoples on an equal basis. 40 In other
words, it adopts a power-sharing formula that bars members of non-

37.
See RICHARD HOLBROOKE, To END A WAR 203-05, 223-24, 240 (1998)
(describing U.S. involvement); see also GRO NYSTUEN, ACHIEVING PEACE OR
PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS?: CONFLICTS BETWEEN NORMS REGARDING ETHNIC
DISCRIMINATION IN THE DAYTON PEACE AGREEMENT 12 (2005) ("Although the draft

agreement was subject to a certain amount of negotiation ... many of the core ideas
and concepts of the original draft remained.").
See HOLBROOKE, supra note 37, at 271-75, 282, 289 (recounting how the
38.
mediation with Bosnia took place); see also Daniel Curran et al., Two Paths to Peace:
Contrasting George Mitchell in Northern Ireland with Richard Holbrooke in BosniaHerzegovina, 20 NEGOTIATION J. 513 (2004) (describing Holbrooke's coercive mediation
style at Dayton); Touval, supra note 9, at 550 (noting United States' support of Bosnia).
39.
See Dayton Agreement, supra note 26, Annex 4, art. 1(3) (establishing the
two entities that make up Bosnia and Herzegovina).
40.
Id. Annex 4, arts. IV(1)(a), V.
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constituent minority groups from being elected to two central political
institutions.
In a landmark judgment delivered in 2009, the European Court
of Human Rights found that the total and permanent exclusion from
the Presidency and House of Peoples of Bosnian citizens that do not
affiliate themselves with one of the three "constituent peoples" was in
violation of the prohibition on discrimination embedded in the
European Convention of Human Rights. 4 ' While the reasoning of the
European Court can be criticized, 42 the European Court importantly
points to alternative, less injurious, power-sharing formulas that
could have been adopted, which would have ensured adequate
representation of all constituent peoples without entailing the total
exclusion of "Others". For example, instead of allocating a fixed
number of seats in the House of Peoples to each constituent people,
the constitution could have determined a maximum number of seats
to be occupied by representatives from each group including "Others."
It might have also been possible to significantly reduce the powers of
the Presidency and House of Peoples without abolishing the latter's
veto power, which seems to have been crucial for reaching an
agreement. 43 However, the Parties did not endorse these alternatives,
and their demand for strictly ethnic based power-sharing was
44
ultimately accepted by the international facilitators.
2.

Imposed Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons

Annex 7 of the Dayton Agreement asserts the unequivocal right
of all refugees and IDPs to freely return to their homes. 45 It also
requires that Bosnian authorities ensure that refugees and IDPs are
able to return in safety, without risk of persecution or discrimination,
46
and that the choice of destination shall be up to the returnees.
Despite
these important
protections,
however,
the Dayton
Agreement's refugee and IDP provisions appear to suffer from a
serious human rights defect in that they do not provide any
protection or support to refugees and IDPs who wish to remain in

41.

See Seidic v. Bosnia, App. Nos. 27996/06 & 34836/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009),
(ruling that the lack of a declaration of affiliation was an improper
discriminatory basis for exclusion).
42.
See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER MCRUDDEN & BRENDAN O'LEARY, COURTS AND
CONSOCIATIONS: HUMAN RIGHTS VERSUS POWER-SHARING (2013) (criticizing the short
and ambiguous argumentation of the court).
43.
See Sejdi6 v. Bosnia, Eur. Ct. H.R., 1¶ 22, 48 (citing an opinion issued by
the European Commission for Democracy through Law [the Venice Commission]).
44.
See id. ¶ 13 (discussing facilitators' reluctant acceptance of these
arrangements).
45.
See Dayton Agreement, supra note 26, Annex 7, art. 1(1) (giving the right to
displaced persons and refugees to return to their homes).
46.
Id. art. 1(2), (4).

¶¶38-56
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their places of refuge rather than return to their original homes. It
should be noted in this context that during more than three and a
half years of war, over 1.3 million Bosnians fled to other countries
and about one million were displaced within Bosnia. 47 Arguably, the
Dayton Agreement architects should have taken into account that the
return of such a huge number of people and the creation of conditions
that would allow them to be safely reintegrated would take a few
years, if not decades, and that during all these war and postwar years
some displaced persons would change their situation and develop
legitimate expectations to stay in their new places. However, the
Dayton Agreement, with its strong emphasis on the right to return, is
clearly unsympathetic to any kind of a right to stay.
The Dayton Agreement's bias in favor of return seems to have
been particularly detrimental to two groups.
The first is refugees who have accommodated to their new
countries, found jobs or established businesses there, or educated
their children in the local culture and language, and do not wish to be
relocated and disoriented once again. While the granting of a
permanent status to refugees in host countries is obviously subject to
the sovereign discretion of the latter, the Dayton Agreement could
have at least urged them to consider the naturalization of refugees in
appropriate cases rather than merely calling upon them to promote
the early return of refugees. 4 8
The second group is IDPs who fled from areas where they
constituted ethnic minorities to areas that were controlled by their
own ethnic group and settled in houses that had been vacated by local
minorities in earlier stages of the war. 49 Dayton's uncompromising
return policy has meant that IDPs who occupied such evacuated
homes have been forced to leave. While the expectations of some of
those IDPs to remain in their places are not necessarily superior to
the property rights of the original owners, they should not have been
entirely ignored. This is particularly true in view of the fact that
moving into abandoned houses was usually in accordance with special
laws adopted by the two entities (the Federation and the Republika
Srpska), which defined vacated houses as "abandoned property" and

47.

See ICG BOSNIA PROJECT - REPORT NO. 33, INT'L CRISIS GROUP, MINORITY

RETURN OR MASS RELOCATION? i-ii (1998), http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/
europe/balkans/bosnia-herzegovina/033-minority-return-or-mass-relocation.aspx
(detailing Bosnian displacement).
48.
See Dayton Agreement, supra note 26, Annex 7, art. 1(5) (promoting the
early return of refugees).
49.
See, e.g., Richard Black, Return and Reconstruction in Bosnia and
Herzegovina:Missing Link, or Mistaken Priority?,21 SAIS REV. INT'L AFF. 177, 191-92
(2001) (detailing ethnic return in Bosnia).
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allowed members of the local majority group to occupy them.50
Although these laws may in themselves be illegitimate and
supportive of ethnic cleansing, displaced individuals in desperate
need of housing solutions are not to be blamed for relying upon them.
It would therefore seem to have been appropriate to have allowed the
Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and
Refugees established under Annex 7 of the Dayton Agreement
sufficient discretion to balance between competing claims of
ownership and occupancy rights, instead of requiring it to
automatically award restitution to the original owner of the property
concerned. 5
The insistence on return in the Dayton Agreement represents a
strategic policy choice of the United States and the EU, who were
determined to undo the consequences of ethnic cleansing. 52 Another
important motivation for insisting on refugee return was the
unwillingness of host countries, most notably Germany, to
permanently absorb them.5 3 While it is true that demands for
recognizing a right to return also came from within the negotiating
parties,54 it would probably not have been given such clear priority
over other solutions if it had not been so important to the
international facilitators.
Facilitator resolve to reverse ethnic cleansing was significant
also during the implementation stage. In a rather unprecedented
move, prominent donors decided to make aid to Bosnia conditional
upon the Parties' compliance with their commitment to facilitating
refugee and IDP return.5 5 For example, the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees, in collaboration with major international donors,
implemented the 'open cities' program. The open cities program
rewarded local authorities that supported refugee return by
allocating them greater funds. 56 These aid conditionalities had some

50.
See Eric Rosand, The Right to Return under InternationalLaw Following
Mass Dislocation: The Bosnia Precedent?, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1091, 1101-02 (19971998) (describing the use of abandoned property laws).
51.
See id.; Dayton Agreement, supra note 26, Annex 7, art. XII(2).
52.
See Rosand, supranote 50, at 1110.
53.
See, e.g., Richard Black et al., Temporary Protection and the Assisted
Return of Refugees from the European Union, 10 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 444, 453-55
(1998) (describing Germany's response as unique because Germany is "one of only a
few countries not to have made provisions for the transferal of status of any Bosnians").
54.
See Pauline Neville-Jones, Dayton, IFOR and Alliance Relations in Bosnia,
38(4) SURVIVAL 44 (1996) (describing the parties' demands).
55.
See James K. Boyce, Aid Conditionality as a Tool for Peacebuilding:
Opportunities and Constraints, 33 DEV. & CHANGE 1025, 1028-30 (2002) (describing
the efforts of international donors to premise aid to Bosnia on refugee return); see also
Black, supra note 49, at 183 (characterizing aid linkage to Bosnia as "particularly
prominent").
For a detailed description and analysis of the Open Cities Initiative, see
56.
ELIZABETH M. COUSENS & CHARLES K. CATER, TOWARD PEACE IN BOSNIA:
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success in enabling the safe return of people to areas where they
constituted ethnic minorities. 57 However, by linking reconstruction
and development aid to refugee return, international donors also
made the alternative option of remaining in one's place of refuge all
the more unfeasible.
3.

Exclusionary Negotiation Process

The Dayton negotiations were highly exclusionary and
nondemocratic and were designed by facilitators to obtain top-down
support for a peace agreement with terms that had been largely
predetermined by the U.S. government. As American mediator
Richard Holbrooke recalls in his memoirs, he selected the site of the
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton as a venue for the talks
mainly because it could be easily "sealed off from the press and all
other outsiders."5 8 Washington presented to Balkan leaders several
preconditions for hosting the talks, among them that they not talk to
the press and that they "come to the United States with full power to
sign agreements, without further recourse to parliaments back
home."59 Another strategic choice that undermined the democratic
legitimacy of the process was to limit participation in the talks, apart
from facilitators, to the three presidents of Bosnia, Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro), and Croatia. 60 This meant that two of the Bosnian
constituent peoples-Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats-were not
represented by leaders of their own communities but rather by the
governments of their kin states.6 1
Civil society representatives were also excluded from the Dayton
negotiations. Apparently, the views and preferences of the "people
who lived through the conflict" were deemed irrelevant for deciding
how to resolve it. 62 Particularly troubling is the exclusion of groups
who were adversely affected by the Dayton Agreement: nonconstituent ethnic minorities (e.g., Jews and Roma), refugees, and
IDPs. Also problematic is the absence of representatives of Bosnian
IMPLEMENTING THE DAYTON ACCORDS 71, 77-79 (2001); INT'L PEACE INSTITUTE, supra

note 7, at 15-21.
57.
See Boyce, supra note 55, at 1026-27 (describing some incidents of success
in linking international aid to Bosnia to refugee return).
58.
HOLBROOKE, supra note 37, at 203.
Id. at 199-200.
59.
60.
See id. (describing considerations faced by organizers of the talks
concerning who to include).
61.
In fact, Bosnian Serb representatives from the Republika Srpska were
physically present at Dayton; however, they were actually excluded from most
discussions and were "essentially isolated." See id. at 243; see also id. at 256, 293, 310.
62.
See Christine Chinkin & Kate Paradine, Vision and Reality: Democracy
and Citizenship of Women in the Dayton Peace Accords, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 103, 149
(2001) (detailing the exclusion of representatives from Bosnian civil society,
particularly women and women's groups, from the negotiations).
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women's groups, especially in view of the systematic use of rape and
other forms of gendered violence as a means of ethnic cleansing
during the Bosnian conflict.6 3
Had women representatives
participated in negotiations, they might have been able to incorporate
a gender perspective into the Dayton Agreement and ensure that the
special experiences and needs of women in Bosnia be adequately
addressed.
B. Afghanistan
Afghanistan is a multicultural, highly fragmented state. It is
comprised of four main ethno-linguistic groups: Pashtuns, Tajiks,
Hazaras, and Uzbeks. Additionally, Afghanistan is host to over a
dozen smaller ethno-linguistic minorities, each of which is, itself,
divided into numerous tribes and clans.6 4 Most Afghans are Sunni
Muslims, but there is a significant minority of Shi'a Muslims as well
as some other religious groups and subgroups. Afghan society is also
divided along geographic lines, with most of the population living in
rural areas and being effectively controlled by regional and local
power holders. Although intercultural tensions were not a major
catalyst in the Afghan war, which lasted from 1979 to 2001, during
some of the war's phases the main armed factions were largely
organized along ethnic and regional lines. 65
In late November 2001, following a U.S.-led military intervention
that ousted the Taliban government, representatives of all major
Afghan factions met in Bonn, Germany under UN auspices, 66 and
with the active support of the United States, 67 in order to establish a

63.
See id. at 150 (arguing that the negotiations failed to recognize the
contribution of women's groups and thus excluded them from the international decision
making process). For further discussion of the problem of women's exclusion from peace
negotiations, see infra Part III.B.
64.
See Reeta Chowdhari Tremblay, Afghanistan: Multicultural Federalism as
a Means to Achieve Democracy, Representationand Stability, in FROM POWER SHARING
TO DEMOCRACY: POST-CONFLICT INSTITUTIONS IN ETHNICALLY DIVIDED SOCIETIES 198,

200-202 (Sid Noel ed., 2005) (detailing the complex cultural divisions between diverse
ethno-linguistic groups in Afghanistan).
65.
See Ebrahim Afsah & Alexandra Hilal Guhr, Afghanistan: Building a State
to Keep the Peace, 9 MAX PLANCK Y.B. OF UN LAW 373, 378-79 (2005) (recognizing that,
while the main armed formations throughout previous conflicts were divided along
ethnic lines, ethnic diversity was not the cause of division).
66.
See U.N. Secretary-General, The Situation in Afghanistan and its
Implications for International Peace and Security: Rep. of the Secretary-General, 2,
U.N. Doc. A/56/875-S/2002/278 (Mar. 18, 2002) (describing the organization of the Bonn
conference by the United Nations).
67.
See MARK FIELDS & RAMSHA AHMED, INST. FOR NAT'L STRATEGIC STUDIES,
A REVIEW OF THE 2001 BONN CONFERENCE AND APPLICATION TO THE ROAD AHEAD IN

AFGHANISTAN 5-6 (Nov. 2011) (describing the role of U.S. Envoy to the Afghan
Opposition, James Dobbins, in preparing and conducting the Bonn talks).

198

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL, 48:179

'

new government that would bring peace and stability to Afghanistan.
Participants in the Bonn talks came from different ethnic, religious,
and geographic groups and represented various political interests. 68
Two quite distinctive groups, however, were conspicuously missing
from the talks. One was the Taliban, the other: women. Whereas the
exclusion of the rogue Taliban leaders from the Bonn talks may be
criticized for its political wisdom,6 9 it does not seem to raise any
human rights concerns. The exclusion of women, by contrast, has
seriously undermined the justice and legitimacy of the Bonn peace
process.
There is quite clear evidence that the identity of the Bonn talks'
participants was determined or at least approved in advance by the
United Nations and other international actors involved in the peace
process. In the weeks that preceded the Bonn conference, the UN
Secretary General's Special Representative for Afghanistan (SRSG),
Lakhdar Brahimi, held intensive meetings with representatives of
the Afghan factions as well as with the foreign ministers of the "six
plus two" group (the six countries bordering Afghanistan plus the
United States and Russia), in which they discussed the plan for the
upcoming peace talks.70 Following these meetings, Brahimi briefed
the Security Council about the planned peace conference,
emphasizing that its main goal would be to establish a multiethnic
"broad-based government that would be representative of all groups
in the country . .. and [enjoy] internal and external legitimacy." 7
Apparently, the participation of women in the talks was not
deemed necessary for achieving these goals. So much so that initially
not even a single woman was invited to participate in the Bonn talks.
It was only under intensive pressure on the part of transnational
women's organizations that the SRSG finally engaged in an effort to
include some women in the Bonn talks. 72 This effort led to the

68.

See

IMTIAZ

HUSSAIN,

AFGHANISTAN,

IRAQ,

AND

POST-CONFLICT

GOVERNANCE: DAMOCLEAN DEMOCRACY? 127, 130 (2010) (presenting the ethnic
identities, external loyalties, and political preferences of the different groups that
participated in the Bonn talks).
69.
See, e.g., FIELDS & AHMED, supra note 67, at 19 (describing and responding
to criticisms of the exclusion of the Taliban from negotiations at Bonn).
70.
Vadim Polishchuk, Foreign Ministers of Six Plus Two Groups to Meet UN
Envoy on Afghanistan, AFGHANISTAN NEWS CTR. (Nov. 3, 2001), available at
www.afghanistannewscenter.com/news/2001/november/nov312001.html
[http://perma.cel
5TAD-E9PP] (archived Oct. 6, 2014); see also FIELDS & AHMED, supra note 67, at 12-14
(noting that following the six plus two group meeting, which took place on November
12, the U.S. Envoy to the Afghan Opposition met with Afghan faction leaders, at the
request of the UN SRSG, to ensure their participation in the peace talks).
71.
U.N. SRSG for Afghanistan, Briefing to the Security Council (Nov. 13,
2001), available at http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/brahimi-sc-briefing.htm
[http://perma.cc/S82X-NP3L] (archived Oct. 6, 2014).
72.
See Jessica Neuwirth, Women and Peace and Security: The Implementation
of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1325, 9 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 253, 254-55
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participation of (merely) two women among the twenty-five official
Afghan delegates to the talks.73 As luck would have it, at the same
time that formal peace negotiations were taking place in Bonn, the
Afghan Women's Summit for Democracy-an informal, NGOinitiated, event that brought together prominent Afghan women to
discuss the future of Afghanistan-was held in Brussels.7 4 The two
women delegates that attended the Bonn Talks were also among the
participants of the Brussels Summit, which created an opportunity
for some interaction between the meetings. These delegates traveled
from Bonn to Brussels, briefed the Summit participants on the
negotiations, and reported back to Bonn.7 5 This participation in both
conferences allowed an even more effective-albeit far from
adequate-representation of women's voices at the peace talks.
The Bonn talks were concluded on December 5, 2001, with the
signing of the Bonn Agreement. This agreement provided for the
establishment of an Interim Authority, which would form the basis
for the subsequent establishment of "broad-based, gender-sensitive,
multi-ethnic and fully representative" permanent governmental
authorities in Afghanistan. 76 At the heart of the Interim Authority
was an Interim Administration, whose members were selected
directly by the participants in the Bonn talks and listed in an Annex
to the Bonn Agreement.7 7 It is stated in the agreement that this
selection was made "with due regard to the ethnic, geographic and
religious composition of Afghanistan and to the importance of the
participation of women."7 8 However, the list that appears in the
Annex tells a somewhat different story. The members of the interim
government indeed represent more or less proportionally the various
ethnic, linguistic and religious groups of Afghanistan;7 9 however, they
(2002) (noting the pressure for the inclusion of women in the process and the eventual
success, as women were included both as delegates and observers).
73.
All together, more than fifty delegates from Afghanistan participated in the
Bonn talks. See HUSSAIN, supra note 68, at 128. However, only twenty-five delegates
formally signed the Bonn Agreement, among them two women, Ms. Amena Afzali and
Mrs. Sima Wali. See Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending
the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, 7-8, Dec. 5, 2001,
available at http://peacemaker.unlb.org [http://perma.cc/GGJ8-7HYT] (archived Oct. 6,
2014) [hereinafter Bonn Agreement].
74.
The Afghan Women's Summit on Democracy was organized by a coalition of
women's organizations in collaboration with the Gender Advisor to the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations and the United Nations Development Fund for Women.
See Afghan Women's Summit for Democracy, EQUALITY NOW (Mar. 2002), available at
http://www.equalitynow.org/node/697 [http:// perma.cc/8KUX-GWLR] (archived Oct. 6,
2014).
75.
See Neuwirth, supra note 72, at 255.
76.
Bonn Agreement, supra note 73, at 2.
77.
Id. Annex IV, at 12.
78.
Id. art. 111(3), at 4.
79.
See Thomas H. Johnson, Afghanistan's Post-Taliban Transition: The State
of State Building after the War, 25 CENTRAL ASIAN SURVEY 1, 5-6 (2006) (mentioning
the affiliations of the members of the Interim Administration).
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do not represent anything close to a proportional share of womenout of thirty government members, only two are women.80 Even
though participation in decision making cannot always guarantee
particular outcomes, it is not unlikely that increased representation
of women in the Bonn Talks would have led to increased
representation of women in the Bonn-established government.
At a press briefing held shortly after the publication of the Bonn
Agreement, the SRSG was asked why only two women were included
in the government. He replied briefly that "there were none in the
recent times in Afghanistan, so it's not a bad beginning."8 1 On
another occasion he suggested that Afghan women did not and should
not have expected more than they got, 8 2 adding:
[W]e have had from the very first day two women in the government.
We now have three in Afghanistan, six in Iraq, which is huge, too much,
but I think we have got to be lucky, we've got very good women. In
Afghanistan there are two or three women, one in particular is doing
very well . . .. But the point is don't run before you can walk. Don't
83
try.

The SRSG's answers should trouble anyone concerned with the fair
representation of women in the government. Not only do the answers
reflect a very low standard for women's political participation in nonliberal countries, but they also reveal skepticism about the ability of
women from such countries to undertake governmental roles.
Moreover, they seem to demonstrate a sense of indifference and even
disdain towards the whole issue of women's representation.
This does not mean that Brahimi's approach is entirely
unfounded. The Bonn peace process found Afghan women living
under a strict gender apartheid regime. During the last decades of
the twentieth century, Afghan women suffered extreme repression,
and were increasingly excluded from public life. They were prevented
from attending schools and working, were not allowed to leave home

80.
One woman was appointed Vice-Chair (one of five) and Minister of Women
Affairs, and the other Minister of Health. See Bonn Agreement, supra note 73,
Annex IV, at 12 (listing the positions and who occupies them).
81.
Press briefing by Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, SRSG for Afghanistan and Mr.
Joschka Fischer, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the FR of Germany, UNITED NATIONS
NEWS CTR. (Dec. 5, 2001), http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/afghanistan/infocusnews
.asp?NewsID=88&slD=1 [http://perma.cc/4GWS-N7JS] (archived Oct. 7, 2014).
82.
In an interview to the Journal of International Affairs, Brahimi noted that
while people based in Western countries may have expected an equal representation of
women in the Afghan government, the expectations of women in Afghanistan were
(rightfully) much lower. Mary Sack & Cyrus Samii, An Interview with Lakhdar
Brahimi, 58 J. INT'L AFF. 239, 245 (2004). To make his point, he cited an Afghan
woman who told him: "'we would like to have one or two women in [the commission for
the preparation of the Loya Jirga]. If it is not possible then there are some men who
are in favor of women's rights. Try to find men who are in favor of women's rights. We
don't want 50 percent."' Id.
83.
Id. at 246 (emphasis added).
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unless covered with a head-to-toe burqa and accompanied by a male
relative, and were regularly attacked by men. While these
discriminatory practices and policies culminated in the Taliban
period, they also prevailed in earlier years under the Mujahdeen
regime and were rooted in patriarchal tribal cultures. 84 Against this
backdrop, the underrepresentation of women in the Bonn talks as
well as in the Bonn-established government can be attributed not
only to a strong domestic opposition to including women but, as
implied by Brahimi in the above cited paragraph, also to the practical
difficulties of finding Afghan women that would have both the
competency and the willingness to assume ministerial posts.8 5
Brahimi may also be right in proposing that from the perspective of
many Afghan women, the participation of even merely two women in
the talks and the appointment of two women as ministers was an
important achievement. 8 6 Finally, we should remember that the
government established in Bonn was a temporary one and was soon
to be replaced by a democratically elected government.8 7
Despite all these problems and excuses, however, it is hard to be
satisfied with the Bonn Agreement's treatment of women's right to
equality. This is particularly true in view of the fact that the Bonn

84.

See

AMNESTY

INT'L,

WOMEN

IN

AFGHANISTAN:

A

HUMAN

RIGHTS

CATASTROPHE 1-2 (Nov. 3, 1995), availableat http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/
ASA11/003/1995/en/942a70a6-eb6O-1ldd-b8d6-03683db9c805/asal10031995en.pdf
[http://perma.cc/B7GF-2GMX] (archived Nov. 5, 2014) (detailing the history of women
in Afghanistan and how these discriminatory practices began); U.N. Secretary-General,
Discrimination Against Women and Girls in Afghanistan: Report of the Secretary
General, U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/2002/5 (Jan. 28, 2002); Huma Ahmed-Ghosh, A History of
Women in Afghanistan: Lessons Learnt for the Future, 4(3) J. INT'L WOMEN'S STUD. 1,
5-7 (2003).
Among the data that can illustrate the socioeconomic barriers to Afghan
85.
women's participation in the government is the high rate of female illiteracy. According
to the UN, in 2001 only 5 percent of Afghan women were able to read and write. See
U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 84, at 5-6. However, even those Afghan women
who were capable of assuming public positions must have been afraid of being harassed
or attacked by fundamentalists. Such fears turned out to be quite founded, as women
who dared to step into public life in the post-Taliban period suffered from regular
intimidations. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, BETWEEN HOPE AND FEAR: INTIMIDATION AND
ATTACKS AGAINST WOMEN IN PUBLIC LIFE IN AFGHANISTAN 11 (Oct. 2004), available at

http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounderlasia/afghanistanl004/afghanistan 1004.pd
f [http://perma.cc/7CVX-7R78] (archived Oct. 14, 2014).
See Sack & Samii, supra note 82, at 246. For similar views expressed in
86.
Afghan feminist scholarship, see Sima Wali, Afghanistan: Truth and Mythology, in
WOMEN FOR AFGHAN WOMEN:

SHATTERING MYTHS AND CLAIMING THE FUTURE 1

(Sunita Mehta ed., 2002); Rina Amiri, Fine Lines of Transformation: Afghan Women
Working for Peace, in LISTENING TO THE SILENCES: WOMEN AND WAR 243, 244-45

(Helen Durham & Tracey Gurd eds., 2005).
87.
See Bonn Agreement, supra note 73, art. I(1), at 3 (establishing an interim
government). That being said, we should also bear in mind that the composition of an
interim government may significantly influence the composition of a successor
permanent government.
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process took place only one year after the adoption of the landmark
UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security.
Stressing "the importance of [women's] equal participation and full
involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace
and security,"8 8 this resolution calls upon member states to ensure
increased representation of women in conflict resolution processes
and to adopt a gender perspective when negotiating peace
agreements. 8 9 One might have expected that the United Nations
would treat the Bonn process as the litmus test of Resolution 1325
and make special efforts to ensure the participation of women, not
only because it was the first UN-brokered peace process to take place
after the resolution was adopted, but also because the situation of
women in Afghanistan occupied a prominent place on the
international agenda at that time and was even invoked as a
justification for the military intervention in the country.9 0 The failure
to adequately address the situation of Afghan women and provide
guarantees for their human rights in Bonn seriously undermined the
credibility of the United Nations' commitment to promoting the
participation of women in peace processes celebrated in Resolution
1325.
C. SierraLeone
The civil war that plagued Sierra Leone from 1991 to 2002 has
come to be known as one of Africa's cruelest natural resources
conflicts. It began with an attempt by the Revolutionary United Front
of Sierra Leone (RUF), led by chief commander Foday Sankoh and
supported by Charles Taylor's government in Liberia, to overthrow
the incumbent government in Freetown and seize control of the
country's diamond mines. Within a few years, the weakness and
unpopularity of the central government allowed the RUF to grow in
power and to effectively control large parts of the country.9 1 While it
initially enjoyed popular support, the RUF soon acquired a notorious
reputation for committing brutal crimes against the civilian
population, including forced recruitment of child soldiers, mutilation,
rape, and mass killings. 92

88.
S.C. Res. 1325, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1325 (Oct. 31, 2000).
Id. paras. 1, 8.
89.
90.
See, e.g., Hilary Charlesworth & Christine Chinkin, Editorial Comment:
Sex, Gender, and September 11, 96 AM. J. INT'L. L. 600, 602-03 (2002) (describing the
history of the intervention).
91.
See Dena Montague, The Business of War and the Prospects for Peace in
Sierra Leone, 9 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 229, 230-31 (2002) (detailing the history of the
RUF).
92.

RAPE:
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In May 1999 the President of Sierra Leone Ahmad Kabbah met
in Lomb, Togo, with representatives of the RUF to negotiate a peace
agreement. An international committee headed by Togolese Foreign
Minister Joseph Koffigo on behalf of ECOWAS, and Special Envoy
Francis Okelo on behalf of the United Nations, mediated the
negotiations. International participants also included representatives
of the Organization of African Unity, the United States, and the
UK. 93
In terms of procedures, the Lomb negotiations were quite
inclusive and transparent. Several Sierra Leonean civil society
groups as well as the Sierra Leonean Inter-Religious Council were
allowed to sit in at formal negotiating sessions. 94 President Kabbah
also convened a National Consultative Conference in Freetown,
bringing together a broad range of civil society actors, to discuss the
government's position in negotiations." At this meeting, Kabbah
explicitly stated that the government would not agree to powersharing with the RUF.96

Eventually, however, the Peace Agreement between the
Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF (Lom6 Agreement) did
provide for power-sharing with the RUF, which was allocated four out
of eighteen ministerial posts as well as four deputy ministerial
positions.9 7 In addition, the Lom6 Agreement provided that Foday
Sankoh would serve as the chairperson of the Commission for the
Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and
Development (CMRRD), which was vested with the power to monitor
the management and exploitation of Sierra Leone's gold, diamonds
and other strategic resources.9 8 It was also stated that for this
purpose Sankoh "shall enjoy the status of Vice President and shall
therefore be answerable only to the President of Sierra Leone."99 This
power-sharing formula was supported by all the international
facilitators, who believed that it would be impossible to put an end to
the conflict without conceding to some of the RUF's core demands.

http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/sierra/ [http://perma.cclWDN7-RLEE] (archived Oct.
14, 2014) (discussing implementation of the agreement); David Lord, The Struggle for
Power and Peace in Sierra Leone, 9 ACCORD 10 (2000). For background literature on the
Sierra Leonean conflict and peace process, see generally HIRSCH, supra note 29; DAVID
KEEN, CONFLICT AND COLLUSION IN SIERRA LEONE (2005).
93.
See Ismail Rashid, The Lomb Peace Negotiations, 9 ACCORD 26, 29 (2000)
(detailing the setup behind the Lomb negotiations).
94.
See HIRSCH, supra note 29, at 81.
95.
Id. at 80.
96.
Id.
97.
Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the
Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone art. V(3)-(4), July 7, 1999, available at
http://peacemaker.unlb.org [http://perma.cc/GGJ8-7HYT] (archived Oct. 6, 2014)
[hereinafter Lomb Agreement].
98.
Id. art. V(2).
99.
Id.
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Given the control that the RUF enjoyed on the ground and its
successful resistance against ECOMOG peacekeeping forces, the only
alternative solution seems to have been a considerable expansion of
international military forces in Sierra Leone, a solution that received
little support outside Sierra Leone. 0 0
The most contested compromise made in Lom6, however, was the
blanket immunity from criminal prosecution granted to all RUF
commanders, soldiers, and collaborators, with respect to any acts
committed by them during the conflict.10 1 In an unprecedented step,
UN Special Envoy Okelo, following instructions from above,
announced the United Nations' objection to the Lom6 Agreement's
amnesty provisions. Okelo signed the Lom6 Agreement on behalf of
the United Nations but added a handwritten reservation to the
agreement declaring that the United Nations could not endorse any
amnesty for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
other serious violations of international humanitarian law.1 02 Two
years later, this disclaimer facilitated the co-establishment by the
Security Council and the government of Sierra Leone of the Special
Court for Sierra Leone, which prosecuted RUF members for crimes
pardoned under the Lom6 Agreement. 0 3
How should we evaluate the United Nations' approach to justice
issues in Sierra Leone? On the one hand, the United Nations might
have been expected to not only add a belated reservation to the Lom6
Agreement but also to refrain from signing it altogether and exert
stronger pressure on the parties to refrain from agreeing on a blanket
amnesty. It might have also been expected to oppose the inclusion of
systematic human rights violators in the Sierra Leonean government.

100.
See, e.g., Rashid, supra note 93, at 27 (detailing the battle between the RUF
and the ECOMOG).
101.
Id. art. IX. It should be noted, however, that the Lom6 Agreement did not
ignore past abuses altogether. Rather, it established a Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC), which was charged with the responsibility to "deal with the
question of human rights violations since the beginning of the Sierra Leonean conflict."
See id. art. XXVI(2). In other countries, notably South Africa, TRCs and amnesties
were essentially linked to each other so that full amnesty was granted only to those
who made full disclosure of their conflict-related crimes. In Sierra Leone, however,
amnesty was unconditional and cooperation with the TRC was completely voluntary.
See Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No. 34 of 1995, §§ 16-22
(1995) (S. Mr.).
102.
See William A. Schabas, Amnesty, the Sierra Leone Truth and
Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 11 U.C. DAVIS J.
INT'L L. & POLY 145, 148-149 (2004).
103.
The government of Sierra Leone, on its part, justified its disrespect for the
Lom6 amnesty provisions by arguing that the RUF had violated the agreement and
that therefore it was no longer binding. See Letter from the Permanent Representative
of Sierra Leone to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/2000/786, Annex (Aug. 10, 2000); see also S.C. Res. 1315, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000).

2015]

THE HUMAN RIGHTS RESPONSIBILITIES OF PEACE FACILITATORS

205

By doing so, it could have arguably contributed to promoting greater
justice for RUF victims, strengthening the international rule of law,
reducing the future incentives of opposition groups to pursue their
goals through violent means, and advancing sustainable peace in
Sierra Leone. On the other hand, it is possible that the RUF would
not have signed the Lom6 Agreement without these concessions. 104
Moreover, as things evolved in Sierra Leone, the power-sharing and
amnesty permitted the developments that eventually led to the
complete marginalization of the RUF; with RUF leaders sitting in
Freetown, it became an easy task to arrest and prosecute them in the
Special Court subsequently established by the United Nations and
the government of Sierra Leone.10 5 It seems, then, that by generally
endorsing the Lom6 Agreement, including its power-sharing
provisions, while at the same time rejecting its blanket amnesty, the
United Nations struck a reasonable balance between justice
considerations and political constraints. It is also possible, however,
that a better informed and planned position of the United Nations,
backed by other international facilitators, would have enabled the
government of Sierra Leone to achieve peace at the price of fewer
dubious concessions to the RUF.
D. Learningfrom FacilitatorExperiences
The cases of Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Sierra Leone suggest that
facilitators can have considerable influence over the terms of peace
agreements and the procedures of negotiations. This is especially true
for militarily and economically powerful facilitators like the United
States, but it is also true for less powerful, yet skillful, facilitators
such as the UN Secretary General Envoys. The three cases also
demonstrate that facilitators' influence can be used to promote
human rights and justice considerations but also to undermine them.
Moreover, they show that facilitators may fail to acknowledge or
refuse to admit their actual or potential influence over the parties.
In Bosnia, the United States and its European partners
compromised justice and human rights principles by endorsing
exclusionary power-sharing arrangements, denying appropriate
solutions to refugees and IDPs who wished to remain in their places

104.
See Laura R. Hall & Naha Kazemi, Prospects for Justice and Reconciliation
in Sierra Leone, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 287, 293-94 (2003) (discussing Sierra Leone peace
process and implications of amnesty); see also Helga Malmin Binningsbo & Kendra
Dupuy, Using Power-Sharing to Win a War: The Implementation of the Lomg
Agreement in SierraLeone, 44 AFR. SPECTRUM, no. 3, 2009, at 87, 96 (contending that
granting the CMRRD chairmanship to Foday Sankoh, which, as noted, entailed de
facto control over most of the country's diamond resources, "was probably the single
most important element in convincing the RUF to sign the peace agreement").
105.
Malmin Binningsbe & Dupuy, supranote 104, at 88-89.
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of refuge, and insisting on exclusionary and non-transparent
negotiation procedures. On the other hand, by requiring local
authorities to allow for the return of refugees and IDPs, facilitators
provided restorative justice to those who did wish to go back to their
homes, and they also sent a deterring message to potential future
ethnic cleansers. Restorative justice and deterrence were also
promoted by facilitators' requirement that the parties cooperate with
international criminal proceedings. 106
In Afghanistan, the UN SRSG was initially tolerant of Afghan
leaders' reluctance to include women in the peace talks, and refrained
from inviting any women to the Bonn peace conference while
presenting this exclusion as the necessary price of peace. Eventually,
however, the SRSG responded to NGOs' pressure and managed to
convince the parties to include a few women in the talks, and he
probably also deserves some credit for the appointment of two women
to the government.
Finally, in Sierra Leone, the United Nations endorsed a peace
agreement that allowed the RUF leaders to sit in the government and
enjoy the fruits of their brutal aggression. At the same time, however,
the United Nations added a disclaimer to the peace agreement
stating that it rejects the granting of amnesty to RUF members with
respect to serious crimes under international law. In reliance on this
disclaimer, the United Nations later co-established the Special Court
for Sierra Leone that prosecuted the perpetrators of such crimes.
Signing the Lom6 Agreement under reservation thus turned out to be
a sophisticated strategy, which, in the particular circumstances of
Sierra Leone, allowed the United Nations to limit the negative impact
of an injurious arrangement that it could arguably not prevent from
being adopted.
To conclude, facilitators' actual, and potential, roles in peace
processes vary widely among countries and conflicts and depending
on the identity, skills, and resources of facilitators. Yet, a close
analysis of these three different peace processes shows that in quite
different settings facilitator choices have had remarkable impact on
the justice of peace negotiations and agreements. This Article
contends that a carefully designed international regulation of
facilitators' activities can significantly improve the chances that,
whenever feasible, they will use their influence to promote justice and
human rights. Before suggesting how exactly international law can
promote these goals, the next two Parts offer a theoretical
justification for such regulation.

106.
See Dayton Agreement, supra note 26, art. IX (emphasizing the parties'
duty "to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of war crimes and other
violations of international humanitarian law").
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IV. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR FACILITATOR RESPONSIBILITY

Placing upon peace facilitators a duty to ensure the justice of
peace agreements that they help achieve goes beyond currently
accepted notions of states' and international organizations' legal
responsibilities. Existing international law recognizes the duty of
states to protect and promote the human rights of their own
citizens10 7 as well as the duty of states to protect non-citizens from
certain forms of serious abuse by their respective governments. 0 8 It
is also generally accepted today that international organizations are
under a duty to prevent and remedy human rights violations
conducted by their own personnel.10 9 By contrast, the idea that
international organizations and states may also have a duty to ensure
that other states are not engaged in human rights violations that are
not of the gravest nature (e.g., exclusion of women from peace
negotiations) is far from obvious and requires careful examination,

107.
See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2, Dec.
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] ("Each State ... undertakes to respect
and ensure all individuals within its own territory . . .the rights recognized in the
present Covenant."); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
pt. 2, art. 4, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]; International
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination art. 2, Dec. 21,
1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter ICERD] ("Each State shall prohibit and bring to an
end ... racial discrimination. . . ."); Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women pmbl., Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter
CEDAW] ("[T]he States ... have the obligation to ensure the equal rights of men and
women .... ); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment art. 2, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT]
("Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other
measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction."); European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 1,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR]; American Convention on Human
Rights pt. 1, art. 1, Nov. 21, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S.143 [hereinafter ACHR]; African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 1, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 ("The
Member States . . . shall recognize the rights, duties, and freedoms enshrined in this
Chapter and shall undertake to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to
them.").
108.
See, e.g., Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, July 28,
1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (requiring states to provide asylum to non-citizens who are
persecuted in their country of origin); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide art. 1, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide
Convention] (circumscribing the duty of states to prevent genocide); Application of
Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. v. Serb.), 2007
I.C.J. 43, 120 (Feb. 26) [hereinafter Bosnian Genocide Case] (adopting a broad
interpretation of the duty to prevent genocide under the Genocide Convention and
clarifying that it covers genocide taking place beyond state borders).
109.
See Tom Dannenbaum, Translating the Standardof Effective Control into a
System of Effective Accountability: How Liability Should be Apportioned for Violations
of Human Rights By Member State Troop Contingents Serving as Peacekeepers, 51
HARV. INT'L L.J. 113, 129 (2010) (explaining a two-prong test for liability of
international organizations).
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not only because of the burden that it imposes on third parties, but
also because it appears to violate the right of the targeted states to
non-intervention in their domestic affairs.
To address these challenges, it seems appropriate to begin the
theoretical inquiry into facilitator responsibilities with the principle
of state sovereignty, which under existing international law serves as
the ultimate basis for, as well as a major constraint upon,
government powers.
To establish the appropriate meaning of this principle and its
implications for delineating peace facilitator responsibilities, this
Part examines three alternative models of sovereignty. First, the
"traditional" model assumes that sovereignty resides in states or
governments as such. According to this model, sovereignty entails the
right of states to manage their internal affairs without external
interference. Second, the "popular" model asserts that sovereignty
belongs to peoples who vest power in their respective governments in
order to promote their collective interests. Under this model, each
government is duty-bound to respect and protect the human rights of
its people. Third, the "human" model suggests that sovereignty
belongs to humanity as a whole and that the powers of governments
are vested in them by all human beings in order to promote the
welfare of humankind. Under this model, governments have to
protect the human rights of all human beings, not only of their own
peoples. For various historical and practical reasons, each
government bears a primary responsibility to discharge its duties
toward humanity vis-A-vis its own citizens. However, governments
also retain a secondary responsibility to ensure that other
governments fulfill their primary duties toward their citizens. This
Article asserts that the human model of sovereignty should be
preferred over the two alternative models because it better accounts
for the interventionist nature that international law is gradually
assuming and because it is more compatible with global justice
principles. These principles suggest that international law, under the
model of human sovereignty, should recognize a relatively broad duty
of states to protect the human rights of non-citizens, which goes
beyond situations of mass atrocities and dire necessity that are
currently acknowledged to generate such a duty.
As will be asserted in Part V, in the context of peace processes
the human model of sovereignty entails that a negotiating
government-and to a great extent, also a government-like
negotiating entity-is bound to pursue a peace agreement that best
serves the interests of its citizens and that is based on equal concern
for them all. At the same time, all the world's other governments
have the responsibility to ensure that the negotiating government
lives up to its duties toward its citizens. This secondary
among
is not equally distributed
responsibility, however,
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governments. In view of their potential contribution to peace
injustices, as well as their greater ability to prevent such injustices,
facilitator states and international organizations (as agents of their
member states) should bear the main responsibility for discharging
the international community's duties toward those affected by peace
agreements, while other governments should bear a residual
responsibility for discharging these duties.
A. The TraditionalModel of Sovereignty
The traditional model of sovereignty is assumed to have its
origins in the 1648 Peace of Westphalia. This model asserts that
sovereignty-that is, the power to control a territory and govern
central aspects of human life within it-resides in states or
governments.
The
most
important
implication
of
this
conceptualization of sovereignty is the right of states, through their
governments, to exercise exclusive authority within their borders free
from external intervention in their domestic affairs: the right to nonintervention.11 0 Upon its establishment in 1945, the United Nations
formally endorsed the Westphalian notions of sovereignty and nonintervention. 1 1 The UN Charter states that the United Nations is
based "on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members"
and provides that it shall not intervene in matters that are
"essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."'1 2 The
prohibition on intervention in the domestic affairs of states was
reiterated and expanded in 1970 in the UN General Assembly's
Declaration on Friendly Relations among States. Whereas under the
UN Charter this prohibition applies only to the United Nations as an
organization, the Declaration on Friendly Relations among States
extends it to individual states and elaborates that it applies to all
forms of intervention, "directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever,
in the internal or external affairs" of any state.113 Similarly broad
interpretations of the principle of non-intervention can be found in
the constitutive documents of some regional peace and security

110.
See Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 20, 20 (1948)
(describing the Peace of Westphalia's establishment of "untrammeled" internal State
sovereignty); David Held, Law of Sates, Law of Peoples: Three Models of Sovereignty, 8
LEGAL THEORY 1, 3-4 (2002) (explaining the emergence and characteristics of classical
state sovereignty).
111.

Cf. LUKE GLANVILLE, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RESPONSIBLITY TO PROTECT:

A NEW HISTORY 132 (2014) (providing a novel historical account of the concept of
sovereignty, which suggests that the "traditional" right of sovereign peoples to selfgovernment and freedom from external interference is actually not so traditional and
was only established for the first time in the UN Charter in 1945).
112.
U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶¶ 1, 7.
113.
See G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/25/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970) (declaring limitations on intervention).
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organizations. 114 In the case of Nicaragua v. U.S., the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) affirmed the customary nature of the principle
of non-intervention, articulating that intervention in a state's affairs
is prohibited if it has "bearing on matters in which each State is
permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely.""s5
The ICJ considered that these matters included the choice of political,
economic, social, and cultural systems, and the formulation of foreign
policy."16

However, while the right to non-intervention has been formally
embedded in key treaties, judicial decisions, and UN resolutions, at
the same time numerous other (and sometimes even the very same)
international legal documents have acknowledged an apparently
contradictory right of states and international institutions to
interfere with the treatment accorded by states to their own citizens
within a state's own borders.11 7 These legal developments have most
notably been associated with the emergence of international human
rights law. The main purpose of international human rights law is to
ensure that state governments will not use their power to abuse their

See, e.g., Charter of the Organization of American States arts. 19-20, Apr.
114.
30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361 (stipulating that States may not intervene
in, or use coercion against, another State's affairs); Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Final Act princ. VI, Aug. 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292 ("The
participating States will refrain from any intervention, direct or indirect . . . .");
Constitutive Act of the African Union art. 4(g), July 11, 2000 (stating that its principles
include the "non-interference by any Member State in the internal affairs of another").
115.
See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 205 (June 27).
116.
Id.
117.
To give just a few examples, Chapter VII of the UN Charter empowers the
Security Council to authorize the use of military, economic, or other sanctions against
states whose behavior is perceived to pose a threat to international peace and security.
In numerous cases-among them in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, East Timor, Darfur,
Libya, and Cote D'Ivoire-the Security Council relied on its Chapter VII powers to
impose economic sanctions against, and authorize military interventions in, states due
to their failure to protect their populations from mass atrocities and humanitarian
crises. See Luke Glanville, The Responsibility to Protect Beyond Borders, 12 HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 1, 3 (2012) (clarifying the legal status of responsibility to protect). In addition, a
right to interfere is embedded in the authority of international human rights bodiessuch as the Human Rights Committee, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, and the Committee against Torture-to monitor states' compliance
with their human rights duties toward their citizens. See ICCPR, supra note 107,
arts. 28-45; ICERD, supra note 107, arts. 8-15; CAT, supra note 107, arts. 17-24
(establishing and defining the mandates of the abovementioned committees,
respectively). An even more intrusive review authority is vested in the regional human
rights courts, namely, the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights, and the African Court on Human and People's Rights, which can
deliver binding decisions requiring states to change their human rights practices. See
ECHR, supra note 107, arts. 19-51; ACHR, supra note 107, arts. 52-69; Protocol to the
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African
Court on
Human
and
People's
Rights,
June
10,
1998,
O.A.U. Doc.
OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III).
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citizens and, moreover, that state governments will take positive
measures to protect and promote human rights for their citizens.
Another major area of international law that emerged during the
second half of the twentieth century and challenges traditional
conceptions of sovereignty and non-intervention is international
criminal law, which has enabled the prosecution by international and
foreign tribunals of individuals, including state officials and even
heads of state, for violations of international humanitarian law and
international human rights law committed against their own
people." 8 To give one more example, the so-called law on democratic
governance-which, at a minimum, seeks to protect the right to free
elections by regulating national election processes-also presents a
major inroad into the traditional model of state sovereignty. 1 9
Alongside the well-established right of states to create norms
and collective mechanisms that regulate the domestic affairs of other
states, in recent years a new and still contested duty to intervene in
some domestic affairs has arguably been emerging in international
law. To the extent that such a duty exists, however, it is currently
limited to the most egregious situations in which states inflict upon
their citizens mass atrocities or fail to protect them from such
atrocities. These include cases of genocide 2 0 and perhaps also of
ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. 12 1 In

&

118.
E.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court pts. II, IX, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia arts. 1-10, S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993); Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda arts. 1-10, S.C. Res. 955 (Nov. 8, 1994);
see also Antonio Cassese, On the Current Trends Towards Criminal Prosecutionand
Punishment of Breaches of International HumanitarianLaw, 9 EuR. J. INT'L L. 2, 11
(1998) (noting that the internationalization of criminal processes "constitutes a major
inroad into the traditional omnipotence of sovereign states").
119.
See Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM.
J. INT'L L. 46, 46 (1992) (describing the emerging role of democratic governance on the
global stage); Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participationin International
Law, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 48, 50 (Gregory H. Fox
Brad R. Roth eds., 2000) [hereinafter DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE] (examining the
influence of democratic governance processes on participation in international law).
120.
As noted above, in the 2007 Bosnian Genocide Case the ICJ affirmed that
the duty to prevent genocide under the Genocide Convention includes an
extraterritorial duty to prevent genocide committed by foreign actors in a foreign land.
See Bosnian Genocide Case, supra note 108.
121.
In 2005, the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted the World
Summit Outcome Document, which provides, inter alia, that "[tihe international
community, through the United Nations ... has the responsibility to use appropriate
diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI
and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity." 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res.60/1,
¶¶ 138-39, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005). Although this resolution does not in
itself have binding force, it may be understood to reflect a consensus among states
about their existing or emerging duties. The duty to protect populations from genocide,
war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity can also be inferred from
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these cases, the world's states are assumed to bear a collective
responsibility to prevent, stop, and/or rectify the wrongful acts of the
delinquent government.
Seeking to reconcile the interventionist nature that international
law has been assuming since the end of World War II with the
traditional concept of non-intervention, which still purports to govern
international relations, 12 2 some commentators have argued that
intervention in domestic affairs is compatible with the principle of
state sovereignty if it is based on previous consent by the intervened
state, which can be expressed, inter alia, by accession to relevant
treaties (e.g., human rights treaties and the Statute of the
International Criminal Court) or by ad hoc approval (e.g., in the case
of 'invited' military intervention). According to this positivist view,
the power of states to enter into international agreements that limit
their domestic authority is part of their sovereign competence. 123
However, justifying the international protection of human rights
and the rule of law on the basis of state consent seems to be
problematic as a matter of principle, because it entails that states do
possess the initial authority to mistreat their citizens and that they
may decide to retain this authority at their discretion. Moreover, at
the practical level, posing states' consent as a precondition for
limiting domestic authority may leave citizens of dissenting countries
without sufficient protection for their basic human needs and may
also undermine international interests associated with their
protection.
In view of these difficulties, contemporary efforts to mitigate the
apparent tension between state sovereignty and international norms

&

the Draft Articles on State Responsibility articulated by the International Law
Commission. These Draft Articles, which are commonly assumed to reflect customary
international law, assert the duty of states to cooperate in order to bring to an end any
serious breach by a state of a peremptory norm of international law. See International
Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, art. 41(1), U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (Nov. 2001). For an insightful analysis of
these provisions and their legal implications, see Glanville, supra note 117, at 11-13,
26-28.
122.
Michael Reisman poignantly describes this tension, noting that the UN
Charter replicates the "domestic jurisdiction-international concern" dichotomy, but no
serious scholar still supports the contention that internal human rights are "essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state" and hence insulated from international
law. W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary
InternationalLaw, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE, supra note 119, at 239, 243.
123.
See, e.g., Myres S. McDougal & Gertrude C. K. Leighton, The Rights of Man
in the World Community: ConstitutionalIllusions Versus Rational Action, 14 LAW
CONTEMP. PROBS. 490, 505-06 (1949) (identifying state consent as the basis for
international protection of human rights); M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Permanent
International Criminal Court, in JUSTICE FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 173, 181
(Mark Lattimer & Philippe Sands eds., 2003) (identifying state consent as the basis for
the ICC's authority); David Wippman, Pro-DemocraticIntervention by Invitation, in
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE, supra note 119, at 293 (justifying pro-democratic
intervention when the legitimate ousted government gives its consent to the act).
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addressing domestic affairs seem to be turning away from consentbased justifications for intervention. Instead, these efforts seek to
redefine the concept of state sovereignty itself and identify its
inherent limitations. Under these alternative conceptualizations of
state sovereignty, the international community's mandate to interfere
with national policies does not depend on the will of the state
concerned. 124 Rather, the mandate of a state to pursue its national
policies depends on its subscription to certain international norms.
Two such conditional understandings of state sovereignty are
reflected in the concepts of popular sovereignty and human
sovereignty. As will be explained in the next section, popular
sovereignty asserts that sovereignty belongs to the people rather than
to the government and that government authority is therefore
conditional upon its ability to promote the well-being of the people.
This Article argues, however, that even the concept of popular
sovereignty does not provide adequate justification for international
intervention in domestic affairs. Human sovereignty can better
account for such intervention.
B. The PopularModel of Sovereignty
Seeking to justify international intervention in domestic affairs,
contemporary scholars commonly argue that sovereignty resides not
in governments, as the traditional model suggests, but rather in
peoples, who confer upon their governments the power to make
policies and execute them on their behalf and for their benefit. Once
given such power, a government is bound to act as a trustee of its
people-it must use its power for no other purpose than to promote
the collective interests of the citizens. A government that fails to do so
risks the loss of its sovereign authority and should anticipate an
international action to protect the interests of its citizens. 125

124.

See SEYLA BENHABIB, ANOTHER COSMOPOLITANISM 13, 16 (Robert Post ed.,

2006) (arguing that international human rights law signals a developing trend in
international law from a treaty-based model to "cosmopolitan law understood as
international public law that binds and bends the will of sovereign nations"); see also
Paul W. Kahn, Speaking Law to Power: Popular Sovereignty, Human Rights, and the
New International Order, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1, 5 (2000) ("The international law of
human rights rests on more than the positivist conception of the origins of law. We are,
after all, most concerned with applying human rights law against non-consenting
regimes. We do not think a state has the option of withdrawing its consent from such
norms.").

125.
See Kofi A. Annan, Two Concepts of Sovereignty, ECONOMIST, Sept. 18, 1999
("States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples,
and not vice versa ...

. These changes . .. oblige us to think anew about such questions

as how the UN responds to humanitarian crises."); Reisman, supra note 122 (arguing
in support of pro-democratic intervention that sovereignty belongs to the people and
that therefore, international measures that seek to give expression to the will of the
people not only do not violate sovereignty but in fact vindicate it); Jeremy Waldron, Are
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The concept of popular sovereignty has its roots in the writings of
seventeenth century philosophers such as Hugo Grotius and John
Locke.1 26 These writers' main concern was the internal legitimacy of
governments. They sought to establish a domestic constitutional
theory that would limit the power of the government vis-A-vis its
subjects and define the terms under which the people have the right
to revoke the power of the government. Contemporary discussions on
popular sovereignty are different from the Grotian and Lockean
classic accounts in that they seek to justify not only domestic
resistance but also international intervention against a government
that fails to fulfill its duties toward its people. Using the concept of
popular sovereignty to justify or require such international
intervention is, however, a highly questionable move. It is not clear
why the mistreatment of citizens by their government should bear
implications not only for its domestic legitimacy but also for its
relationships with other states.1 27 It is for this reason that Michael
Walzer, in his famous critique of humanitarian intervention, rejects
the view that "a tyrannical government . .. because it has no standing
with its own people (no moral claim upon their allegiance), has no
standing in international society either."1 28 While this Article does
not concur with Walzer's non-interventionist approach, it accepts
that, under the prevalent understanding of sovereignty, the
international standing of a government does not derive directly from
its standing with its citizens.
Moreover, it could be argued that the principle of popular
sovereignty not only does not provide sufficient justification for
external intervention against a bad government but actually
prohibits such intervention. According to this view, sovereignty of the
people entails that the domestic failures of a government should only
be corrected by domestic mechanisms that are designed to reinforce
Sovereigns Entitled to the Benefit of the InternationalRule of Law?, 22 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 315, 325-26 (2011) (noting that the international protection of human rights is a
"consummation of the concept that a government is a trustee for its people's interests").
126.
See generally HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF PRIZE AND BOOTY (1604);
JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (1689). For an analysis of the
trusteeship theory of sovereignty in the writings of Grotius and Lock, see Jedediah
Purdy & Kimberly Fielding, Sovereigns, Trustees, Guardians: Private Law Concepts
and the Limits of Legitimate State Power, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 165 (2007).
127.
Under the common interpretation, internal (domestic) sovereignty is
different from external (international) sovereignty, and each of them generates a
varied set of rights and duties for different actors. In the context of pro-democratic
intervention, Byers and Chesterman similarly note that although "the concept of
popular sovereignty plays an important role in modern international law, it simply
does not follow that the illegitimacy of one regime authorizes a foreign state . .. to use
force to install a new and 'legitimate' regime." Michael Byers & Simon Chesterman,
'Tou, the People": Pro-DemocraticIntervention in International Law, in DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNANCE, supra note 119, a 259, 269.
128.
Michael Walzer, The Moral Standing of States, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 209,
211 (1980).
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the popular will, such as elections and judicial review. 129 Even in
situations in which such mechanisms are ineffective, and the only
plausible way to oppose an oppressive government is by use of force,
one could argue that this should not be the force of other states'
armies. For John Stuart Mill, this is precisely what popular
sovereignty and self-determination are about: people must become
free by their own efforts or submit to their unfortunate collective
destiny. 30
It appears, then, that the idea of popular sovereignty alone
cannot justify international intervention in states' affairs, let alone
require such intervention. A different conceptualization of
sovereignty is needed to bridge the gap between a government's
internal and international legitimacy. The next section presents the
model of human sovereignty, which can provide a basis for both a
right and duty to intervene in the domestic affairs of states under
certain circumstances.
C. The Human Model of Sovereignty
1.

The Principles of Human Sovereignty

The basic assumption of the human sovereignty model is that
sovereignty inheres in humanity as a whole.13 1 Like the popular
sovereignty model, the human sovereignty model rejects the

129.
See, e.g., Kahn, supra note 124, at 3.
See John Stuart Mill, A Few Words on Non-Intervention, in DISSERTATIONS
130.
AND DISCUSSIONS III 252-64 (1873) ("[L]iberty which is bestowed on them by other
hands than their own, will have nothing real, nothing permanent."); see also MICHAEL
WALZER,

JUST

AND

UNJUST

WARS:

A

MORAL

ARGUMENT

WITH

HISTORICAL

selfargument regarding
(1977)
(discussing Mill's
ILLUSTRATIONS 87-88
determination).
131.
This construction of sovereignty draws heavily on Eyal Benvenisti's recent
account of sovereignty as trusteeship of humanity. Note, however, that Benvenisti
focuses on the duty of governments to take into account the interests of foreign
stakeholders when shaping their domestic policies, which can be defined as the inward
implications of the idea of sovereigns as trustees of humanity. I, on the other hand,
focus on its outward implications-that is, on the right and duty of foreign
governments to intervene in the domestic policies of a government that fails to
adequately protect the interests of its own citizens. See Eyal Benvenisti, Sovereigns as
Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of States to Foreign Stakeholders, 107 AM.
J. INT'L L. 295, 314 (2013). For other recent accounts that seek to establish a humanityoriented understanding of sovereignty, see Anne Peters, Humanity as the A and Q of
Sovereignty, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 513, 533 (2009) (offering a "humanized understanding
of state sovereignty"); ANTONIO AUGUSTO CANCADO TRINDADE, INTERNATIONAL LAW

FOR HUMANKIND: TOWARDS A NEW JUS GENTIUM 2 (2010) (discussing the "orientation
of international law toward the fulfillment of the needs and aspirations of human
beings, of peoples and of humankind as a whole"); RUTI G. TEITEL, HUMANITY'S LAW 8
(2011) (calling for the "incorporation of humanitarian concerns as a crucial element in
the justification of state action").

216

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 48:.179

Westphalian premise that sovereignty resides in the ruler. However,
whereas the popular model locates sovereignty within geographically
delineated communities identified as peoples or nations, the human
model attributes sovereignty to the entire community of human
beings. Accordingly, under the human sovereignty approach, it is
humanity as a whole that transfers sovereign powers to governments
in order for them to protect and promote human welfare and
humanity as a whole to which governments owe fiduciary duties.1 32
For historical, practical, and other reasons, the duties of
governments toward humanity are divided among them so that each
government is primarily responsible for advancing the well-being of a
certain portion of the world's population who lives in a delineated
territory assigned to that government's jurisdiction. 3 3 However,
since the government's power stems from humanity at large, it also
has a secondary responsibility for the well-being of the rest of
humanity. 134
It is the task of international law to define exactly how a
government's responsibilities toward humanity should be fulfilled in
view of each government's primary responsibility toward its citizens.
For example, international human rights law provides that while
each government should be the main protector of its citizens' human
rights and have considerable discretion regarding how these rights
are protected, the protection granted by a government to its citizens
may, and in some cases even ought to, be monitored and enforced by
the rest of the world's governments. Similarly, international criminal
law provides that while the primary responsibility for prosecuting
grave human rights violations rests upon the government in whose
jurisdiction these violations occur, other governments have the power
to prosecute these violations in the case that the responsible
government is unable or unwilling to do so, using their domestic
courts, the International Criminal Court, or ad hoc international
35
tribunals.s

132.
See Benvenisti, supra note 131, at 296.
133.
For a similar argument, see Robert E. Goodin, What is So Special about our
Fellow Countrymen?, 98 ETHICS 663 (1988). Goodin contends that "[t]he duties that
states .. . have vis-A-vis their own citizens are not in any deep sense special. At root,
they are merely the general duties that everyone has toward everyone else worldwide."
Id. at 681. According to Goodin, these general duties are distributed among states
because "general duties point to tasks that, for one reason or another, are pursued
more effectively if they are subdivided and particular people are assigned special
responsibilities for particular portions of the task." Id.
134.
For a similar-albeit theoretically obscure-distinction between the
'default' responsibility of states to protect their populations and the 'residual' or
'fallback' responsibility borne by the broader community of states to protect those
populations, see INTERNATIONAL
COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION
SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 7-16 (Dec. 2001).

135.

See supra note 118.
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The human sovereignty model offers a new definition of state
sovereignty as the organizing principle of international law. Under
this definition, the principle of "sovereign equality of states" can be
understood to refer not to their equal right to be free from external
interference in their domestic affairs but rather to their equal duty to
protect and promote the well-being of their own citizens and the rest
of humanity. Accordingly, the corollary right to non-intervention
exists for a state only when it properly protects the human rights of
its citizens such that the fiduciary duties owed by the state
concerned, as well as by other states, toward these people are
satisfied.
2.

The Moral Underpinnings of Human Sovereignty

The human sovereignty model not only accounts better than the
traditional and popular models for the abundance of international
norms that seek to regulate domestic affairs but also is more
compatible with basic principles of global justice. In particular, the
human sovereignty model finds support in the principles of the
shared ownership of all human beings over the world's natural
resources and the equal moral worth of all human beings. The logic of
these principles, and the support that they provide to conceptualizing
sovereignty as entailing inherent duties toward non-citizens, has
been comprehensively discussed elsewhere. 136 The following
paragraphs briefly summarize those principles, while beginning to
explain the relevance of the principles for delineating the human
rights responsibilities of peace facilitators.
The shared ownership principle goes back to the hypothetical
"state of nature" in which the territory of the world and the natural
resources it contains belonged "to mankind in common." 13 7 In this
state, so goes the classic social contract theory, people could not really
enjoy unlimited rights to use the world's resources because of the
threat of an "all against all" war.1 38 People therefore opted to vest in
a common government the power to create and enforce laws that limit
their individual rights but also secure them.' 3 9 To fulfill this task,
however, a government must exercise supreme control over the
territory inhabited by its subjects 140 and must also limit the size of

136.

See Benvenisti, supranote 131, at 305-12.

137.

JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT ch. V, § 25 (1689); see also

EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS Book I § 203 (1758) ("The earth belongs to
mankind in general; destined by the Creator to be their common habitation ... .").
See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch. 14 (1651) (theorizing that the human
138.
condition can be reduced to "war of every one against every one").
139.
See id.
140.

See HENRY SIDGWICK, THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICS 252 (4th ed. 1919).
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the population under its control. 141 According to this narrative, the
dominion of individual states over parts of the earth's surface that
originally belonged to mankind in general "can be conceptualized as
originating from a collective regulatory decision at the global level,
rather than being an entitlement that inheres in sovereigns."1 42 In
accordance with this regulatory decision, the authority of each
government over the territory allocated to it depends on two
conditions. The first condition the government must satisfy is that it
use this territory and the natural resources found therein for the
purpose justifying the allocation in the first place-that is, to promote
the collective interests of the people residing in it. The second is that
it also recognize the original or "natural" right of other people to
derive benefits from the territory and resources under its control and,
to the extent necessary, use the power or influence that it draws from
controlling them to protect the interests of those other people.
The second principle of global justice that supports the human
sovereignty model is the equal moral worth of all human beings. This
principle contends that all persons qua persons deserve equal respect
and concern. In the global justice debate, this moral principle is
mainly invoked by cosmopolitans to support the claim that
responsibility for the well-being of people must extend beyond state
borders.14 3 Liberal nationalists, on the other hand, contend that the
principle of equal concern can best be implemented within the
framework of democratic nation-states. 144 Despite possible tensions
between them, 14 5 the two political positions represented by these

141.
Limitations on the size of states' populations are apparently indispensable
for governments to fulfill their tasks effectively. See Benvenisti, supra note 131, at 306;
supratext accompanying note 131.
142.
Benvenisti, supra note 131, at 309; see also Patrick Macklem, What is
International Human Rights Law?, 52 MCGILL L.J. 575, 585 (2007) ("[I]nternational
law does more than regulate the exercise of sovereign power. It determines who
possesses sovereignty. It establishes, in other words, sovereignty's international legal
existence.").
143.
See, e.g., Thomas Pogge, Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty, 103 ETHICS 48,
48 (1992) ("[T]he ultimate units of concern are human beings ... rather
than ... states."); Brian Barry, Statism and Nationalism: A Cosmopolitan Critique, in
NOMOS XLI: GLOBAL JUSTICE 12 (Ian Shapiro & Lea Brilmayer eds., 1999) (arguing
that people are more important than states); David Held, Restructuring Global
Governance 37 MILLENNIUM 535, 535 (2009) (suggesting that states should be judged
by their ability to deliver equal liberty and social justice).
144.
See, e.g., Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, 33 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 113, 113 (2005) ("[T]he nation-state is the locus of political legitimacy and the
pursuit of justice .... .").
145.
One proposition concerning the existence of such tension has been famously
asserted by Martha Nussbaum, who has argued that unless one acknowledges, as she
does, that special obligations toward fellow citizens are instrumental for promoting the
well-being of humanity, such special obligations must be deemed inconsistent with the
cosmopolitan ideal of equal moral worth. Martha C. Nussbaum, Patriotism and
Cosmopolitanism, in FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY? 2 (Joshua Cohen ed., 1996). On the more
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not essentially
nationalism-do
and
claims-cosmopolitanism
contradict each other. In its moderate versions, cosmopolitanism does
not insist on replacing existing nation-states with a single world
state, whereas moderate nationalism does not deny that the special
obligations of states toward their citizens may coexist with, and
should in some cases even yield to, certain obligations toward distant
others.1 46 The difference between the positions advocated by (most)
cosmopolitans and (most) nationalists is, then, not so much about
quality as about quantity. The question at stake is how highly we
should prize our obligations to compatriots as opposed to how strong
47
Addressing this
our commitment to non-citizens should be.1
of state
is important for delineating the scope
question
responsibilities in different situations. In the context of peacemaking,
for example, it can help determine how much effort and resources
peace facilitators should invest in order to induce the negotiating
parties to establish a just peace. The human sovereignty model does
not purport to provide a generally applicable answer to this question.
However, it clearly endorses a moderate approach to the principle of
moral equality and the duties that stem from this principle. Human
sovereignty acknowledges the primacy of the relationship between a
government and its citizens, yet it requires governments to invest
considerable effort in protecting the interests of non-citizens in case
their own governments fail to do so.

practical level, David Miller has raised the concern that in some cases global human
rights protection may impose on the better-off society considerable costs that can
hardly be allocated in an equal manner among its members (for example, the risks
associated with humanitarian intervention are mainly borne by individual soldiers and
aid workers). In such cases, Miller argues, it may be impossible to achieve global
justice in a way that is consistent with the fair treatment of individuals as members of
national communities, and a "justice gap"-that is, "a gap between what people in poor
countries can legitimately claim as a matter of justice . . . and what the citizens of rich
countries are obliged, as a matter of justice, to sacrifice to fulfil these claims"-may
appear. DAVID MILLER, NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND GLOBAL JUSTICE 274 (2007).

146.
See David Held, Principles of Cosmopolitan Order, in THE POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY OF COSMOPOLITANISM 10, 16-19 (Gillian Brock & Harry Brighouse eds.,
2005) (drawing a distinction between 'thick' cosmopolitanism, which dismisses special
relationships and responsibilities unless they are instrumental for promoting the wellbeing of humanity, and 'thin' cosmopolitanism, which recognizes that obligations
toward humanity at large are compatible with non-instrumental particular
obligations); THOMAS POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 169 (2008)
(distinguishing between legal cosmopolitanism, which is "committed to a concrete
political ideal of a global order under which all persons have equivalent legal rights
and duties - are fellow citizens of a universal republic," and moral cosmopolitanism,
which presents a moral principle of equal concern that may support a political order
less uniform than a universal republic, such as a system of autonomous states).
See THE GLOBAL JUSTICE READER xvii (Thom Brooks ed., 2008).
147.
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Toward an International Duty to Intervene

To conclude the forgoing discussion, the human sovereignty
model asserts that states draw their powers from humanity, and
therefore have, alongside their primary duties toward their citizens,
secondary duties toward the rest of humanity. This model should be
endorsed for two main reasons. First, the alternative traditional and
popular models are at odds with the interventionist character of
much of contemporary legal doctrine. They create a logical gap that
undermines the coherence and apparent legitimacy of the
international legal order. The human model bridges this gap, while
still accounting for the right and duty of governments to award
priority to the needs of their own populations. Second, the human
sovereignty model is more compatible than alternative models with
the moral principles of the equal worth of all human beings and their
shared ownership over the world's natural resources.
These moral principles introduce human sovereignty as a
conceptual framework that not only makes sense of the
interventionist elements of existing international law but also calls
for expanding them. It suggests that beyond the established right to
intervene in the domestic affairs of states in various ways and for
various purposes, states, and international organizations as their
agents, should also have a broader duty to intervene than they
currently have. If governmental authority rests on the sovereign
virtue of all human beings, there is no reason why this authority
should not be held to encompass greater responsibilities toward
humanity than merely preventing genocide or other mass atrocities.
As already noted, the secondary duties of governments toward noncitizens cannot be unlimited. They must be constrained to allow
governments to properly fulfill their primary duties toward their
citizens. However, limiting the duties of governments to protect noncitizens to only the worst human catastrophes does not seem to strike
an appropriate balance between their primary and secondary
responsibilities. Some less severe, but serious enough, human rights
violations such as human trafficking as well as natural disaster- or
poverty-induced neediness may also give rise to an international duty
to protect if the government that bears the primary responsibility
fails to do so. It need be remembered that effective protection in these
cases will usually place a smaller burden on the external protectors
than, for example, military intervention in the case of genocide. The
same is true for the duty to help states achieve just and sustainable
solutions to violent conflicts, which this Article suggests should be
established.
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The Problem of Collective Responsibility

Attributing to all the world's governments a secondary
responsibility to prevent mass atrocities, alleviate poverty, or
promote just peace is susceptible to collective action problems. The
concern is that the diffused responsibility to protect will lead to
inaction-each potential guarantor will prefer to avoid the costs of
protection, knowing that it will not be held individually responsible
for the failure to do SO. 148 There are at least two possible ways to
overcome this problem. One is to set criteria for singling out a specific
state or group of states as responsible for discharging all the world's
collective duties toward humanity in a given situation, another is to
assign this responsibility to an international organization that would
discharge it on behalf of the world states.
Regarding allocation criteria, it should be noted that these
criteria may vary across areas of collective responsibility. However,
there are at least two criteria that appear to have a strong moral and
practical appeal in many areas, including peacemaking. The first is
special contribution to the wrongful situation, and the second is
special capacity to make it better. The contribution criterion
resonates with a basic common sense morality principle, according to
which the causation of harm should usually generate a remedial
responsibility. 149 The logic of the capacity criterion is also
straightforward-if we want bad situations put right, we should
assign responsibility to those who are best placed to do so. 1so This
rationale is apparently so obvious that in the Bosnian Genocide Case
the ICJ found Serbia responsible under the Genocide Convention for
not preventing genocide in Bosnia on the basis of the
proposition-which does not find support in the wording of the
convention, but which the court did not find necessary to
explain-that the first criterion for deciding whether a state has a
responsibility to prevent genocide is "clearly the capacity to influence
effectively the action of persons likely to commit .

.

. genocide."1 5 The

contribution and capacity criteria are, of course, not free from
problems,1 52 and, as noted above, they are not applicable in all

148.

For general literature

explaining

problems of collective

action,

see

generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965); Garrett Hardin,

The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
149.
See David Miller, DistributingResponsibilities, 9 J. POL. PHIL. 453, 455-60
(2001) (illustrating the normative interplay of causation, justification, and
responsibility for harm).
150.
Id. at 460-61 (2001).
151.
Bosnian Genocide Case, supranote 108, at 1 430.
152.
For example, in cases where a state is in urgent need of financial or
military assistance, many other states can be assumed to be able to provide at least
some funds or troops to assist it. The question thus arises whether the richest and
militarily strongest states should bear the ultimate responsibility to act, or perhaps
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instances where a collective responsibility to protect should exist.15 3
However, as will be elaborated in the next section, in the context of
peacemaking both criteria clearly point to peace facilitators as a
distinguished group of actors that should be selected to discharge the
collective responsibility to promote just and sustainable peace.
As noted above, another way to overcome collective action
problems associated with the common responsibilities of states is to
assign those responsibilities to international organizations. Indeed,
the ability to provide public goods, which may include the discharging
of collective responsibilities, is often understood to be one of the main
raisons d'6tre of international organizations.1 5 4 However, assigning
collective responsibilities to international organizations can only offer
a partial solution to problems of inaction at the international level.
The reason for that is that international organizations themselves
often prove to be unable to act effectively to change state practices
inter alia because of their limited resources and the problem of
capture by powerful states whose interests differ from those of the
majority of member states. In any event, under international law, the
conferral of state responsibilities upon international organizations
does not release states from their original responsibility. 155

each minimally capable state should bear some responsibility in accordance with its
relative capacities. The first option may be problematic from a distributive justice
perspective, whereas the latter may raise coordination and efficiency concerns.
153.
For example, the contribution test will usually be irrelevant for
determining which state should discharge the responsibility to help countries affected
by natural disasters.
154.
See, e.g., Bruce M. Russett & John D. Sullivan, Collective Goods and
International Organization,25 INT'L ORG. 845, 846 (1971) (drawing on Mancur Olson's
THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION to explain the development of international
organizations); Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act Through Formal
International Organizations, 42 J. CONF. RES. 3, 3 (1998) (asserting that international
organizations help states obtain public goods through their centralized structure as
well as their independence).
155.
See Bosnian Genocide Case, supra note 108, 1 427. The ICJ notes that even
if state parties to the Genocide Convention have delegated the power to prevent
genocide to competent UN organs, they are not relieved of their own responsibility to
act if the UN fails to do so. Id. For a similar argument, see Ralph Wilde, Enhancing
Accountability at the International Level: The Tension Between International
Organizationand Member State Responsibility and the Underlying Issues at Stake, 12
ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 395, 401 (2005-06) (asserting that states should be held
accountable for the acts of an international organization of which they are members).
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V. IMPLICATIONS OF THEORY FOR PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
A. Facilitators'Contributionto Peace Injustices and Their Capacity to
Prevent Them
Under the human sovereignty model, the main responsibility for
the justice of peace negotiations and agreements is borne by the
governments that negotiate and sign them. These governments must
represent the interests of all their citizens in a fair and equitable
manner while making sure that their human rights are adequately
protected. At the same time, all the world's governments bear the
responsibility to ensure that the Parties live up to their duties toward
their citizens. In accordance with the contribution and capacity
criteria, governments that assume facilitating roles in a given peace
process should be singled out to discharge this guarantor
responsibility. The same is true for international organization
facilitators that inherit from member states the responsibilities
associated with the power to make peace.
Both the potential contributions of facilitators to peace
injustices, and their special capacity to prevent them, are
demonstrated in the cases analyzed above in Part III. With regards to
contribution, in all three cases facilitators played an important role in
determining negotiation procedures and peace terms. In Bosnia, the
U.S. government dictated an exclusionary negotiation process,
drafted the constitutional annex that prevented small ethnic
minorities from participating in key political institutions, and
insisted on the return of refugees and IDPs while effectively denying
their right to stay in their places of refuge. In Afghanistan and Sierra
Leone, the United Nations, as a leading facilitator, played a less
active role in promoting injurious arrangements; however, it did
actively help to consummate and implement the Bonn and Lom6
agreements. The United Nations helped despite being fully aware of
the exclusion of women in the first case and the granting of
considerable political power to war criminals in the latter case.
One could argue that an indirect contribution to injustices of the
kind that can be attributed to the United Nations in the cases of
Afghanistan and Sierra Leone is too modest to generate any
responsibilities. It need be remembered, however, that the
contribution principle is not invoked here as an independent basis for
attributing responsibilities to facilitators in the first place but rather
as a criterion for assigning the duty to discharge collective
responsibilities that arise to all states on the basis of their sovereign
powers. For the purposes of such allocation, the threshold of
contribution can arguably be lower than for the purpose of attributing
remedial responsibility in the first place. This means that whenever
third parties facilitate a peace process, they should make reasonable
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efforts to prevent the parties from pursuing injurious procedures or
arrangements, or otherwise be held responsible (on a secondary basis)
for these injuries.
As already noted, while the cases of Bosnia, Afghanistan, and
Sierra Leone illustrate the potential contribution of facilitators to
peace injustices, they also point to their special capacity to prevent or
reduce such injustices, which, as argued above, provides another
reason for selecting them to discharge the collective responsibility of
states to do so. As the Bosnian case shows, powerful facilitators like
the United States can effectively use the threat to employ military
sanctions to induce the parties to stop fighting and sign a peace
agreement. Theoretically speaking, such a threat can also be used to
ensure the consistency of negotiation procedures and peace
arrangements with human rights norms. However, imposing a duty
to use military sanctions or even allowing their use for that purpose
appears to be unjust in terms of the price that it would exact from
both facilitators and the negotiating parties compared to the average
gravity of peace injustices. Moreover, such sanctions may put into
question the consensual basis of the peace agreement and therefore
also its validity under international and domestic law.
A duty to use economic sanctions, although somewhat less
controversial, may also be too burdensome, and perhaps even
counterproductive, in terms of the antagonism that it might create
within the targeted party. However, such sanctions should not be
rejected outright as a means of promoting human rights norms in
some peace negotiations. Positive economic incentives, by contrast,
appear to be an appropriate means for advancing just peace. They are
particularly attractive in view of the fact that third parties in any
event invest billions of dollars to support the implementation of peace
agreements. 156
Conditioning such financial assistance
upon
negotiators' compliance with human rights norms does not involve
any additional allocation of funds and therefore places no serious
economic burden upon facilitators. Even though donors have, so far,
been quite reluctant to explicitly apply conditionalities to post-conflict
financial assistance 1 5 7-the
linking of funds to refugee return in
Bosnia being an exceptional example-this approach can be gradually
changed, along with a broader change in the international
conceptualization of the role of peace facilitators. It is worth
emphasizing again that donors' assistance is usually expected, and

156.
See Forman & Patrick, supra note 15, at 1 (noting that the in the 1990s, the
international community promised $100 billion in aid to thirty-six countries recovering
from violent conflicts).
157.

See ACHIM WENNMANN,
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taken into account, by negotiators already at the negotiation stage,
which means that financial aid conditionalities can be employed to
affect not only the manner in which the Parties implement the peace
agreement but also their earlier choice of peace terms and even their
choice of negotiation procedures. For instance, donors can announce
from the outset that they will provide financial assistance to the new
government that is about to be established under the peace
agreement only if it is inclusive of women or ethnic minorities. In
fact, conditionalities can be employed not only by donors but also by
peacekeepers.15 8 Although the services that peacekeepers offer do not
usually translate into immediate financial benefits, they may be
valued highly enough by the parties for conditionality to make a
difference. For once a government has engaged in peace negotiations,
it usually has a strong interest in bringing about an implementable
and sustainable peace.
Finally, the least intrusive, but not necessarily least effective,
means that facilitators can use to promote the justice of peace
negotiations and agreements are the basic diplomatic means of
persuasion and shaming. In particular, mediators can use their
personal and professional skills, as well as their intimate relationship
with the parties and special understanding of their interests and
concerns,1 5 9 to convince them that adherence to justice requirements
is in their best interest. At a minimum, mediators can alert the
parties to justice problems and refer them to relevant international
legal norms. This function can be especially important when
negotiators do not have their own team of international legal experts.
As we have seen, persuasion and appeal to relevant legal norms were
the main human rights-promoting methods relied upon by the special
UN envoys in Afghanistan and Sierra Leone. In the case of
Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi was apparently able to invite women
to participate in the peace talks by invoking international
expectations from the post-Taliban regime. In Sierra Leone, Francis
Okelo unsuccessfully attempted to convince the parties to preclude
the most serious crimes from the Lom6 Agreement's amnesty
provision. Consequently, he added an apparently toothless disclaimer
to the agreement regarding the illegality of this amnesty, which later
facilitated the prosecution of grave crimes by the Special Court for
Sierra Leone.
As noted above, assigning to peace facilitators the main duty to
discharge the international community's (secondary) collective
responsibility to promote justice in peace processes does not relieve

See supra Part II.C (defining the role of peacekeepers in the international
158.
community).
See supra Part II.A (defining the role of mediators in the international
159.
community).
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other states of the residual responsibility to do so. In particular, nonfacilitator states may be required to take action in three rare but not
implausible scenarios: first, when a peace process takes place without
significant involvement of third parties; second, when facilitators are
unwilling to act or when their acts do not yield satisfactory results;
and third, when the circumstances are suitable for the use of
measures that cannot be effectively employed by peace facilitators
alone, such as non-recognition of the illegal outcomes of a peace
agreement (e.g., non-recognition of an oppressive regime or of a
discriminatory transfer of territory).1 60
In any event, it is important to bear in mind that while military
recognition
sanctions,
and
economic
sanctions,
sanctions,
conditionalities can all induce negotiating governments to respect
human rights, they may also have serious adverse effects on the very
same populations that they seek to protect. In view of this risk-as
well as the requirements to reduce the burden that is placed on
facilitators, to respect the right of the negotiating parties to
independently determine their future, and, at the end of day, to also
achieve a peace agreement-it is necessary to use justice-promoting
measures in a careful and responsible manner, while giving due
consideration to all possible implications. As a general rule, less
coercive measures such as persuasion and selective financial
inducements should be preferred over more coercive ones, which
should be reserved for cases of serious human rights violations that
cannot be prevented through other means. No less importantly,
international law should construct facilitator duties in a manner that
allows them sufficient space to adapt legal requirements to the
particular circumstances of a given case. This Article argues that
these principles of proportionality, restraint, and flexibility should
apply not only to the secondary human rights duties of facilitators but

160.
Traditionally, the main criterion for the recognition of states/governments
and their territorial claims was that of effective control. See Hans Kelsen, Recognition
in InternationalLaw: Theoretical Observations, 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 605, 607-08 (1941);
Sean D. Murphy, Democratic Legitimacy and the Recognition of States and
Governments, 48 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 545, 546-47 (1999). Over time, however,
recognition criteria have evolved to include, and even give priority, to some legality and
justice considerations. Most notably, after the dissolution of the communist bloc,
compliance with democracy and human rights requirements has been posed as a
condition for the recognition of new states in Eastern and Central Europe and their
admission to international organizations. See, e.g., Declaration on the Guidelines on
the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union, Dec. 16,
1991, 31 I.L.M. 1486 (recognizing "new states in Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union"); Declaration on Yugoslavia, Dec. 16, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 1485 (recognizing the
independence of all Yugoslav republics); Jean-Francois Flauss, Les Conditions
d 'Admission des Pays d'Europe Central et Orientale au Sein du Conseil de L'Europe, 5
EUR. J. INT'L L. 401 (1994). These developments suggest that the non-recognition of
injurious peace outcomes is not an imaginary scenario.
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also to the primary human rights duties of the Parties, which are the
duties that facilitators are supposed to enforce.

B. Human Rights Obligationsto be Enforced by Facilitators

This Article is concerned with the secondary responsibilities of
third-party facilitators to promote justice in peace processes. These
secondary duties essentially stem from the primary duties of
negotiators toward their constituencies-it is those primary duties
that facilitators have to ensure compliance with. The question which
human rights and justice obligations apply to peace negotiators under
existing international law, and which duties should apply to them as
a matter of lex ferenda, is a complex one and cannot be fully
addressed within the confines of this Article. This section, however,
mentions some of the main substantive and procedural duties that
currently apply to peace negotiating governments, as well as some
obligations that arguably should be applied to them if we accept the
human sovereignty model's assertion that governments are dutybound to promote the interests of all their citizens in a fair and
equitable manner.
Under existing international law, peace negotiators must refrain
from adopting arrangements that clearly infringe on the human
rights of their citizens. For example, Parties cannot adopt an
agreement that provides for the collective punishment of a group
whose members were allegedly involved in illegal fighting. Parties are
also prevented from establishing a constitutional framework that
explicitly denies the basic human rights of any segment of their
population. In addition, peace negotiators are not allowed to grant
amnesties to persons who, during the conflict, committed particularly
serious crimes such as genocide and, in the case of an inter-state
conflict, grave breaches of international humanitarian law norms. 161
As noted, however, contemporary peace agreements do not
usually include such blunt infringements of international law. Most
peace-related injuries are neither clearly in breach of, nor
unambiguously consistent with, international legal norms. Thus, for
example, some legal experts have convincingly argued that certain
types of involuntary peace-induced population transfers-including

161.
See Genocide Convention, supra note 108 ("Persons committing genocide or
any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are
constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals."); Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War arts. 146-48,
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Convention to Protect Civilians], available
at https://www.icrc.org/appliclihllihl.nsflTreaty.xsp?documentId=AE2D398352C5BO28
C12563CD002D6B5C&action=openDocument [http://perma.cc/LD6K-WAL3] (archived
Sept. 26, 2014) (listing grave breaches that must be punished).
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post-World Wars-style expulsions of ethnic minorities 162 and
Triangle-style transfers of populated territories'es-essentially
violate a range of well-established human rights, including the rights
to dignity, equality, and freedom of movement.1 64 However, in the
absence of explicit prohibition on peacetime transfers (as opposed to
wartime transfers1 65), their illegality might be successfully contested
by negotiators. It therefore seems desirable to put in place an explicit
prohibition on those types of peacetime population transfers that
appear to be incompatible with basic human rights norms. To take
another example, it is not clear whether, and when, power-sharing
arrangements that include exclusionary elements are acceptable
under international human rights law. The judgment of the European
Court of Human Rights in the case of Sejdi6 v. Bosnia can provide
some guidance on this matter;1 66 however, it does not have the force
of a binding precedent, and in any event, its reasoning is somewhat
obscure and may be hard to apply in other cases. To clarify the matter
and assist countries in tailoring appropriate political solutions to
inter-group strife, international lawmakers may articulate explicit
rules on power-sharing which may refer, inter alia, to their legitimate
scope and to the mechanisms through which they may be adopted and
replaced.
However, rather than focusing on the substantive contents of
peace agreements, it seems preferable to direct the bulk of

162.
In the aftermath of World War I, Turkey and Greece signed an agreement
for the compulsory exchange of their Greek and Turkish minorities, which was later
incorporated into the multilateral Lausanne Peace Treaty. See Treaty of Peace with
Turkey art. 142, July 24, 1923, 28 L.N.T.S. 11. At the end of World War II, the Allies
signed an agreement that sanctioned the forced expulsion of millions of ethnic
Germans from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. See Report of Tripartite
Conference in Berlin (Potsdam Communique), July 17-Aug. 2, 1945, art. XIII,
reprinted in 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 245 (1945), available at http://www.trumanlibrary.org/
calendar/travellog/documents/index.php?pagenumber=119&documentid=17&documen
tdate=1945-08-07&studycollectionid--TL&nav--ok [http://perma.cc/AG8D-QL6E] (archived
Sept. 26, 2014).
163.
See Ravid, supra note 5 (examining a possible peace deal under which the
Little Triangle and Wadi Ara are transferred from Israel to Palestine).
164.
See Alfred De Zayas, Ethnic Cleansing1945 and Today: Observations on its
Illegality and Implications, in ETHNIC CLEANSING IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY EUROPE 787
(Steven Bd1a Vdrdy & T. Hunt Tooley eds., 2003) (asserting the illegality of Post-World
Wars-style expulsion of populations); Eyal Benvenisti, Lieberman, The State Exists to
Serve Its Citizens, HAARETZ (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium1.583258 [http://perma.cc/SVX2-Y9VV] (archived Sept. 26, 2014) (asserting the
illegality of the transfer of the Triangle area to Palestine); Aeyal Gross, Population
Dump: Is Lieberman's Plan to Redraw IsraeliDemographics Legal? HAARETZ (Mar. 29,
2014), http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.582613 [http://perma.cc/G2EX-YHDX]
(archived Sept. 26, 2014) (analyzing the legality of the plan to redraw Israeli borders).
165.
Wartime population transfers are explicitly prohibited under the Fourth
Geneva Convention. See Convention to Protect Civilians, supranote 161, art. 49.
166.
See Sejdid v. Bosnia, App. Nos. 27996/06 & 34836/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009).
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international regulation efforts at the procedures through which
peace agreements are achieved. The goal of such procedural
regulation should be to ensure that the views and preferences of all
those who might be adversely affected by the terms of the peace
agreement are adequately represented in the negotiation process.
This goal can be promoted through the incorporation of procedural
justice standards into peace negotiations. Procedural justice
standards such as participation, transparency, and reason-giving can
offer opportunities to affected stakeholders to present their views and
preferences and have them considered by negotiators. As this Article
argues, the main advantage of such procedural constraints over
substantive ones is that they can help promote an equitable allocation
of the burden of peace among domestic groups without imposing on
the parties any particular choice of values. 16 7 Another important
advantage is that procedural constraints do not run the risk of
precluding an arrangement that the parties consider to be a sine qua
non condition for peace. In other words, they seem to pose a smaller
threat to the success of negotiations than substantive constraints.16 8
At present, the only international legal instrument that directly
addresses peace negotiations and introduces into them procedural
justice requirements is the Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000)).
As noted earlier, Resolution 1325 urges member states to ensure
"increased representation"
of women in conflict resolution
processes. 169 This groundbreaking resolution can serve as model for
developing further procedural justice norms that would require peace
negotiators and facilitators to incorporate into the decision making
process not only women but also ethnic minorities, displaced persons,
and other affected groups whose interests tend to be disregarded. 170

C. The Obligations of Non-State Negotiators and Facilitators
The vast majority of contemporary armed conflicts are not
strictly international but rather internal or hybrid, involving a
government on the one hand and an armed opposition group fighting
for the reallocation of domestic political power or a national liberation

167.
See infra Part V.D.1.
168.
See infra Part V.D.2.
169.
See S.C. Res. 1325, supra note 88.
170.
It is worth mentioning that the UN Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement, despite having no binding power, have made an important step toward
acknowledging IDPs participation rights. These principles assert that IDPs should be
able to fully participate in the planning of their return or resettlement, but the
principles do not explicitly refer to peace processes. See U.N. Secretary-General
Representative, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, princ. 28, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 11, 1998).
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movement fighting for the independence of a secessionist or occupied
territory on the other hand. Consequently, in many peace
negotiations at least one of the parties is a non-state actor.11 1 At the
same time, third party facilitating roles, in particular mediation, are
also being increasingly assumed by NGOs and other non-state
actors. 172 The questions arise, therefore, whether, and to which
extent, non-state negotiators and facilitators should and can be bound
by (primary or secondary) human rights duties.
As far as non-state negotiators are concerned, there seems to be
much logic in applying to them human rights duties similar to the
ones borne by state negotiators, given the similar powers that they
exercise. In fact, in some cases-Sierra Leone being an examplethese quasi-state actors have greater control over national territory
and population than the official government. The idea that armed
opposition groups and national liberation movements should be
accountable to the population under their control also finds support
in international humanitarian law, which applies to these entities
some duties concerning the protection of civilian population during
armed conflicts.' 7 3 The underlying assumption is that where armed
opposition is strong, the government is relatively weak and may not
be able to effectively protect its citizens. Applying international legal
constraints directly to non-state belligerents can therefore improve
the protection granted to vulnerable populations.1 74
Another justification for applying humanitarian law duties to
non-state belligerents focuses on these actors' claims for legitimate
political power. As Christian Tomuschat has explained, with respect
to the duties of non-state belligerents during war:
A movement struggling to become the legitimate government of the
nation concerned is treated by the international community as an actor

171.
See CHRISTINE BELL, ON THE LAW OF PEACE: PEACE AGREEMENTS AND THE
LEX PACIFICATORiA 308 (2008) (estimating that 91 percent of the peace agreements
signed since 1990 are intra-state agreements). While the fact that most contemporary
peace agreements involve non-state actors surely has to do with the fact that most
contemporary conflicts involve such actors, it is worth nothing that the parties to the
conflict are not always identical to the parties that negotiate and sign the peace
agreement.
172.
See supra Part II (noting the growing involvement of non-state facilitators
in peace negotiations).
173.
See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, common
art. 3, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (extending provisions of
Geneva Convention to conflicts non-international in nature).
174.

See

THEODOR

MERON,

HUMAN

RIGHTS

IN

INTERNAL

STRIFE:
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INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 39 (1987) ("Article 3 should be construed as imposing
direct obligations on forces fighting the government."); LIESBETH ZEGVELD,
ACCOUNTABILITY OF ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 34 (2002)

(noting the trend in international practice "to diminish the relevance between the law
applicable to international and internal armed conflicts").
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who, already at his embryonic stage, is subject to the essential
obligations and responsibilities every State must shoulder in the
75
interest of a civilized state of affairs among nations.1

In the context of peace negotiations, the rationale articulated by
Tomuschat seems to apply even more forcefully, for it is precisely at
this stage that opposition demands for legitimate political power start
to be realized, whether through internal power-sharing arrangements
or through the establishment of a new independent state. It is
important to stress, however, that the direct human rights
obligations of non-state negotiators during peace processes, just like
the direct obligations of non-state belligerents during war, cannot and
should not release the state from its duty to make its best efforts to
prevent human rights violations within its jurisdiction and ensure
that the interests of all citizens are adequately represented in
negotiations.
Both legal theory and legal doctrine thus seem to provide at least
some support for the application of human rights duties to non-state
peace negotiators. It also seems reasonable to allow, and even
require, facilitators to enforce non-state negotiators' compliance with
their human rights duties by using sanctions, inducements, and
persuasion methods similar to those that should be used in relation to
states. As a practical matter, too, distinguishing between state and
non-state negotiators can be difficult during the process of the
integration of an armed opposition group into the government or the
transformation of a national liberation movement into an
independent government.
The situation is different, however, with respect to the secondary
duties of non-state facilitators. Transnational or domestic peace
NGOs acting as mediators cannot be said to exercise quasigovernmental functions that generate state-like responsibilities, nor
can they be said to have an agency relationship with states that
confer upon them powers and duties (as in the case of intergovernmental organizations like the United Nations). It is therefore
hard to attribute to non-state facilitators secondary international
human rights duties under the human sovereignty model (or indeed
under any other plausible model of sovereignty). This limitation,
however, should not be a source of pessimism about the promotion of
human rights by peace facilitators, for two reasons. First, as noted in
Part II, the vast majority of peace facilitators are states and
international organizations rather than non-state actors. Second, as
we will see in Part VI, in recent years non-state facilitators have

175.

Christian Tomuschat, The Applicability of Human Rights Law to Insurgent

Movements, in KRISENSICHERUNG UND HUMANITARER SCHUTZ-CRISIS MANAGEMENT
AND HUMANITARIAN PROTECTION: FESTSCHRIFT FOR DIETER FLECK 587 (Horst Fischer

et al. eds., 2004).
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shown increasing willingness to voluntarily adopt professional codes
of conduct that emphasize the need to promote justice and
accountability in peace processes. While the scope of the human
rights duties acknowledged in these standards is still quite limited, it
is not unlikely that the processes that have led to their emergence
will also lead to their future expansion.
D. Problems and Criticisms
The idea that peace facilitators should have a duty to ensure the
compatibility of peace negotiations and agreements with substantive
and procedural justice requirements is susceptible to criticisms of
both a principled and pragmatic order. The main principled concern is
that these duties would lead to excessive intervention of third parties
in the discretion of the Parties and undermine their people's right to
self-determination. The main pragmatic concern is that the
imposition of justice constraints upon negotiators and facilitators may
undermine their ability to find an agreed solution to the conflict.
1.

Undermining Self-Determination

Peace processes are central to national self-determination like
few or no other areas of domestic policymaking are. 176 Peace
processes change borders, re-allocate political power, instigate
constitutional and economic reforms, transform interethnic relations,
and redefine collective identities. Indeed, they provide a platform
through which peoples answer "the key questions of 'who we are' and
'what we want."' 1 77 Hence, requiring third party facilitators to
intervene with the procedures and outcomes of these processes runs
the risk of undermining national self-determination at its formative
moments.
This tension between facilitator intervention and selfdetermination is further problematized by the fact that the parties to
peace negotiations are usually governments of developing states or
quasi-governmental entities within those states. Facilitators, by
contrast, are usually developed states or international organizations

176.
For the purposes of the present discussion, national self-determination can
be defined as the international legal principle that peoples should be able to exercise
political control over central aspects of their common lives. See ALLEN BUCHANAN,
JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION:
INTERNATIONAL LAW 206 (2004).

MORAL

FOUNDATIONS

FOR

177.
See Brian Mello, Recasting the Right to Self-Determination: Group Rights
and PoliticalParticipation,30 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 193, 194 (2004) (suggesting that
self-determination "serves to safeguard the ability for individuals as group members to
participate in answering and acting upon the key questions of 'who we are' and 'what
we want').
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dominated by such states. Requiring facilitators to monitor the
human rights aspects of peace processes may therefore increase the
leverage of developed states over the domestic affairs of developing
states and reinforce inequalities between developed and developing
countries in the enjoyment of the right to self-determination.
Moreover, it is not unlikely that developed countries acting as peace
facilitators will take advantage of their responsibility to enforce
justice requirements to advance their own interests. For example,
they can strictly enforce a norm requiring the repatriation of refugees
where many refugees have fled to developed countries, as was the
case in Bosnia, but refrain from effective enforcement of the same
norm when most refugees are concentrated in developing countries. A
counterargument is that regulation can do precisely the opposite, that
is, it can constrain facilitators' discretion so that the pressures that
they exert upon negotiators will be directed at promoting just and
sustainable peace rather than promoting their own political interests.
These concerns seem to reflect an irresolvable tension between
the external and internal dimensions of self-determination-that is,
between the need to respect the autonomous choices of peoples as
expressed by their national governments and the need to ensure that
these choices do not deny minimum freedom and autonomy to some
domestic constituents.1 7 8 Indeed, much as the far-reaching political,
economic, cultural, and security implications of peace processes make
the
problematic from
particularly
third-party intervention
perspective of domestic groups who believe that their government
adequately represents their collective aspirations, they also make it
particularly necessary from the perspective of other domestic groups
whose preferences and aspirations are played down by the
government. Self-determination concerns should therefore not be a
bar to international regulation of peacemaking. Self-determination

178.

For a

discussion

on the

internal dimension

of the

right to

self-

determination, see Allan Rosas, Internal Self-Determination, in MODERN LAW OF SELF-

DETERMINATION 225, 225-227 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1993) (discussing internal
self-determination as a legal principle); Jean Salmon, Internal Aspects of the Right to
Self-Determination: Towards a Democratic Legitimacy Principle?, in MODERN LAW OF
SELF-DETERMINATION (examining the right to self-determination through the principle
of democratic legitimacy); Patrick Thornberry, The Democratic or Internal Aspect of
Self-Determination With Some Remarks on Federalism, in MODERN LAW OF SELFDETERMINATION (relating self-determination to federalism); Gregory H. Fox, SelfDetermination in the Post-Cold War Era: A New Internal Focus, 16 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 733 (1995). For an illuminating discussion of the tension between external and
internal

self-determination,

see

SEYLA

BENHABIB,

ANOTHER

COSMPOLITANISM 17

(Robert Post ed., 2006) (suggesting that the post-World War II international legal
developments have given rise to what she defines as "the paradox of democratic
legitimacy"); cf. IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 257-60 (2002)
(purporting to eschew this tension by offering a relational conceptualization of selfdetermination, which entails that self-determination is about non-domination, as
opposed to non-interference).
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concerns should instead be taken into account in the articulation of
both the primary human rights duties of negotiators (for example, by
focusing on procedural duties, which are generally less intrusive into
decision maker discretion than substantive ones) and the measures
that facilitators should employ to enforce these duties (for example,
by giving preference to non-coercive measures over coercive ones).
2.

Undermining Peace Prospects

There are two main scenarios as to how establishing facilitators'
responsibility to ensure negotiator compliance with human rights
norms can undermine peace prospects. First, it may deter potential
facilitators from offering their assistance, and negotiators from
accepting it, and thus lead to a general decline in peace-facilitating
services, which are essential for the conclusion and implementation of
peace agreements. Although this is not an improbable scenario, it is
quite unlikely to become commonplace. As noted above, facilitators
currently do their job voluntarily and invest considerable economic
and diplomatic resources in it, while risking international and
domestic criticisms in the case that the peace process fails. They
consider this effort, and the associated risk, worthwhile because of
the significant benefits that they can draw from helping to resolve
conflicts.17 9 It is doubtful that the extra weight of secondary human
rights responsibilities will significantly change the cost-benefit
calculation that currently drives states to offer their assistance. This
is all the more true for international organization facilitators who see
the promotion of international peace as their main objective. It is also
doubtful that facilitators' commitment to promoting human rights
would significantly deter negotiators from accepting their assistance.
As noted, negotiators are exposed to facilitator pressures anyhow,
and it is not necessarily to their detriment if these pressures are
curbed by legal rules.
The second way in which human rights duties can undermine
peace prospects is by denying negotiators and facilitators the
maneuvering space they need in order to reach viable solutions to
violent conflicts. In particular, substantive constraints on negotiators'
discretion might remove essential bargaining chips from the
negotiating table. In Sierra Leone, for example, there was speculation
that peace would have been impossible without full amnesty and
power-sharing with the murderous RUF militia. 8 0 Procedural
constraints do not tie negotiators' hands in the same way, but they
too might complicate the already difficult task of reaching a peace
agreement. Procedural justice measures such as participation and

179.
180.

See supra Part II.D (discussing facilitator motivations).
See supranote 104 and accompanying text.
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transparency can be used by 'spoilers' to stall negotiations"' and can
make it hard for negotiators to demonstrate their willingness to make
painful concessions. They may also be very time-consuming and
threaten the momentum for peace.
The possibility that procedural and substantive constraints
would be an obstacle to the progress of peace negotiations and make
it harder to achieve a peace agreement cannot be denied. However,
against this risk, we should consider the chance that such constraints
will improve peace prospects in both the short and long term. In the
short term, the public deliberation entailed by procedural justice
requirements can promote rational and cooperative bargaining.1 82
These gains must not be underestimated, given that peace
negotiations are so often hindered by hostility, distrust, false
interpretations of reality, and other cognitive biases. 8 3 Explicit
substantive constraints, in turn, can help the parties reach an
agreement by providing an "objective standard" which they cannot
dispute.18 4 In the long term, both procedural and substantive
constraints can contribute to the sustainability of peace by increasing
peace's perceived legitimacy and public acceptance, and by reducing
the incentives of discriminated-against groups to resort to violence.' 8 5
In any event, the possibility that international regulation will hinder
peace negotiations, just like the possibility that it will undermine
(external) self-determination, should be taken into account by
international lawmakers when articulating the human rights duties
of peacemakers.

181.
See Stephen John Stedman, Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes, 22 INT'L
SEC. 5 (1997) (examining the problem of spoilers in peace negotiations).
182.
The potential contribution of procedural justice to promoting rationality
has been extensively discussed in deliberative democracy literature. According to
JiIrgen Habermas, a properly constructed public deliberation that enables the free
transmission and processing of views and information is the key to reason-based
policies. See JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A

DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., 1996) (discussing
the rule of law and possible scenarios of democracy in various postindustrial societies);
JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: REASON AND

THE

RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY 273-339 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1981) (reflecting on
social action, purposive activity, and communication).
183.
See BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION pt II (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds.,
1995) (discussing cognitive biases and other psychological barriers to dispute
resolution).
184.
See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 81-94 (2d ed. 1991) (outlining the case for using
objective criteria).
185.
On the connection between procedural justice and outcome acceptance, see
ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE ch. 7
(1988); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990) (discussing the positive
impact of procedural justice on compliance with the law).

236

VANDERBILT]OURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 48:179

VI. FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE: AVENUES FOR DEVELOPING AN
INTERNATIONAL PEACEMAKING REGIME
The foregoing discussion offers a starting point for international
lawmakers to develop norms that clarify and further develop the
primary human rights obligations of peace negotiators, as well as
norms that recognize the secondary human rights obligations of
third-party facilitators. There are numerous ways to develop such
peacemaking norms, each with its distinctive advantages and
shortcomings. This Part briefly sketches out four principal methods,
noting peacemaking norms that have already been formed using each
of them. In one way or another, these processes entail the parallel
development of negotiator and facilitator obligations, reflecting the
proposition that they are inextricably connected. The overview begins
with formal and binding lawmaking processes and then moves on to
less formal processes. It suggests concentrating lawmaking efforts on
the soft end of the spectrum, not only because such efforts are likely
to be more fruitful, but also because reliance on soft, flexible norms
may somewhat mitigate the principled concerns about selfdetermination and the pragmatic concerns about peace prospects
associated with the international regulation of peacemaking. The
overview concludes with some remarks on the role of facilitators in
developing peacemaking norms.
A. A Peacemaking Convention
The classic way to develop binding international peacemaking
norms would be through the adoption of an international convention
that articulates the human rights duties of peace negotiators and
facilitators. That such a convention would be joined by a significant
number of states, however, is quite unlikely. As public choice scholars
have observed, governments tend to very much cherish their
sovereign powers. 186 A government therefore will normally agree to
join a treaty that limits its discretion only if the benefits that it draws
from international cooperation are particularly high and exceed the
costs of losing sovereign authority. This is usually not the case when
the issues addressed by a treaty are essentially domestic, as in a
peacemaking convention. Admittedly, in some cases, a state may

186.
See, e.g., Arthur A. Stein, Coordination and Collaboration:Regimes in an
Anarchic World, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 115, 117 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983)
("International politics is typically characterized by independent self-interested
decision-making, and states often have no reason to eschew such individualistic
behavior."); Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International
Governance, 54 INT'L ORG. 421, 437 (2000) ("The potential for inferior outcomes, loss of
authority, and diminution of sovereignty makes states reluctant to accept hard
legalization.").
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decide to ratify a treaty that regulates domestic affairs in order to
promote its general international reputation. Oona Hathaway
suggests that such considerations provide a major explanation for the
wide ratification of human rights treaties.18 7 However, unlike the
general idea that basic human rights should be respected, the idea
that peacemaking should be subjected to explicit human rights and
justice constraints does not seem to be a bon ton in contemporary
international politics. Quite to the contrary, secret and exclusionary
negotiations are an acceptable peacemaking strategy, and the need to
make "painful" concessions in order to achieve peace is rarely
questioned. As international peacemaking law develops, these
perceptions are likely to change. However, as long as they prevail, the
desire for international prestige is unlikely to be a significant driving
force for the ratification of a peacemaking convention. This is true
both for states that consider themselves potential parties to peace
negotiations and for states that wish to serve as facilitators, which
currently do not seem to have a good enough reason to subject their
peace facilitating discretion to strict, binding international
obligations.
B. InternationalOrganizationResolutions
The reluctance of states that expect to be involved in peace
processes to adopt a peacemaking convention that limits their
sovereign discretion can be bypassed by applying peacemaking norms
to them without or against their will. Such non-consensual
lawmaking is possible whenever a non-plenary or a majority votebased international organization organ is authorized under the
constitutive document of the organization to make decisions that are
applicable to all member states. Among all existing 10 organs, the
most serious candidates for creating non-consensual peacemaking
norms seem to be the UN Security Council (SC) and the UN General
Assembly (GA).
The UN charter assigns the primary responsibility for promoting
international peace and security to the SC.18 8 In accordance with
Chapter VII of the Charter, the SC has the power "to determine the
existence of any threat to the peace [and] make recommendations, or
decide what measures shall be taken . .. to maintain or restore
international peace and security."18 9 While SC recommendations are,

187.
See Oona A. Hathaway, The Cost of Commitment, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1821
(2003) (discussing the circumstances which influence a country's decision to join
international treaties).
188.
See U.N. Charter, supra note 112, art. 24(1) (delineating responsibility of
Security Council).
189.
See id. art. 39 (delineating responsibility of Security Council).
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as their name suggests, merely hortatory, its decisions are binding
upon member states.19 0 Traditionally, the SC has used its Chapter
VII mandate to adopt resolutions that relate to specific conflicts or
situations. In recent years, however, it has increasingly-and
controversially-adopted thematic resolutions addressing issues or
concerns that cut across conflicts.1 91 The language of a few of these
resolutions suggests that they are intended to create binding
obligations for states. 192 Others are formulated as mere
recommendations. Among the latter, one can find Resolution 1325,
which calls upon member states and the UN Secretary General to
promote the participation of women in peace processes.' 9 3 The
growing tendency of the SC to adopt thematic decisions, including
decisions addressing the responsibilities of peace negotiators and
facilitators, suggests that the SC may be willing to further develop
international peacemaking norms in the future. It should be noted,
however, that the veto power of the permanent members, who often
serve as peace facilitators and, in addition, have complex global
interests implicating various conflict situations, may be a barrier to
the articulation of more controversial or demanding responsibilities
than ensuring the participation of women.
The subject-matter authority of the GA is wider than that of the
SC and spans all matters within the scope of the UN Charter,
including the promotion of human rights.1 94 Furthermore, in terms of
its "decisional authority," the GA is explicitly authorized under the
UN Charter to make non-binding recommendations with respect to
general issues of international concern.1 95 The formal authority of the
GA to adopt non-binding resolutions concerning the human rights
responsibilities of peacemakers is thus uncontested. In view of the
fact that legal experts1 96 and non-governmental organizations' 9 7 have

190.
See id. arts. 25, 48(1), 103 (asserting Member States' obligation to comply
with SC resolutions).
191.
For an overview of this phenomenon, see Paul C. Szasz, The Security
Council Starts Legislating, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 901 (2002) (discussing the Security
Council's legislative turn in the context of counterterrorist measures); Cora True-Frost,
The Security Council and Norm Consumption, 40 NYU J. INT'L L. & POL. 115 (2007).
192.
See S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) (using decisive
language to impose counterterrorist duties upon states); S.C. Res. 1540, UN Doc.
S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004) (imposing various anti-terror measures upon states).
193.
See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
194.
See U.N. Charter, supra note 112, arts. 1, 10 (providing the purpose of the
Charter and process for questions or recommendations to the Members or Security
Council).
195.
See id. art. 13(1) (outlining when the General Assembly can initiate studies
and make recommendations).
196.
See, e.g., Jost E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAwMAKERS 304-10 (2005) (discussing the International Law Commission's influence on
the GA).
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considerable influence over the GA's agenda and in view of the fact
that non-binding norms are usually more easily adopted than binding
ones, the prospects for the articulation of peacemaking standards by
the GA seem to be quite good. That being said, it should also be noted
that so far only a fraction of the reports, recommendations, and
resolutions addressing post-conflict justice concerns, which have been
adopted by the UN Commission on Human Rights or by one of its
Sub-Commissions, were ultimately endorsed by the GA.1 9 8 A close
examination of the history and evolution of these normative
initiatives, which goes beyond the scope of this Article, may be
beneficial for planning future legislative efforts in the area of
peacemaking within the framework of the United Nations.
C. Intra-OrganizationalCodes of Conduct
Much of the activity of international organizations and
transnational NGOs is regulated by internal guidelines, policies, or
"codes of conduct" that they adopt through relatively simple and fast
standard-setting processes.1 99 A few such instruments have been put
in place by peace facilitating organizations that address justice issues
in peace processes. For example, shortly after he instructed his
197.
See, e.g., Paul Szasz, General Law-making Processes, in THE UNITED
NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 27 (Christopher C. Joyner ed., 1997).
198.
See Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and
Abuse of Power, G.A. Res. 40/34, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/34 (Nov. 29, 1985); Basic
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 (Dec. 16,
2005). The origins of these resolutions can be found in the reports submitted to the
Commission on Human Rights by the independent experts Theo van Boven and Cherif
Bassiouni. The GA did not adopt several other reports and declarations. See Special
Rapporteur on Human Rights and Population Transfer, Draft Declaration on

Population Transfer and the Implantation of Settlers, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/23 (June 27,
1997) (by Mr. Al-Khasawneh) (declaring standards on transfer of populations in all
situations, peacetime and distress); Special Rapporteur on Amnesty, Final Rep. on the
Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations (Civil and
Political), E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.1 (Oct. 2, 1997) (by Louis Joinet) (discussing the
study on impunity of perpetrators of human rights violations); U.N. Secretary-General
on Internally Displaced Persons, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 11, 1998) (by Francis M. Deng) (stating the rights of
IDPs); United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm'n on Human Rights, Updated Set
of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to
Combat Impunity, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 (Feb. 8, 2005) (by the independent
expert Diane F. Orentlicher) (reaffirming commitment to human rights by combatting
impunity); Special Rapporteur, Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for
Refugees and Displaced Persons, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/17 (June 28, 2005) (by
Paulo S6rgio Pinherio) (detailing a progress report regarding property restitution for
refugees).
199.
See Mary Kay Gugerty, The Effectiveness of NGO Self-Regulation: Theory
and Evidence from Africa, 28 PUB. ADMIN. & DEV. 105 (2008) (discussing self-

regulation by NGOs involved in policy making in Africa).
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special envoy to sign the Lom6 Agreement with a reservation about
the legality of its amnesty provision, 200 the UN Secretary General
issued general guidelines to his envoys addressing the issue of
amnesties. According to the Secretary General, these guidelines,
which were not published, were intended "to assist [envoys] in
tackling human rights issues that may arise during their efforts" and
be "a useful tool with which the [UN] can assist in brokering
agreements in conformity with law and in a manner which may
20
provide the basis for lasting peace." 1
An example of a non-governmental initiative to develop a code of
conduct for mediators can be found in a joint report published by the
Center for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD) and the International Centre
for Transitional Justice (ICTJ). The report, entitled "Negotiating
Justice: Guidelines for Mediators," seeks to design best practice to
help mediators address justice issues during peace negotiations. 202
The report includes concrete advice and recommendations to
mediators, among them to provide clear guidance to the negotiating
parties on the demands and limits of international law, using expert
203
input where necessary.
Finally, several financial aid agencies have adopted internal
organizational policies that condition their assistance on the "good
governance" of recipient countries. The World Bank's Environmental
and Social Safeguard Policies, for example, require borrowing
countries to submit to the Bank detailed assessments of the
environmental and social risks of development projects, referring,
inter alia, to adverse effects on indigenous peoples and on potentially
displaced persons. Such assessments should be prepared after
204
informed consultations with affected populations and local NGOS.

200.
See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
201.
Press Release, Secretary-General Comments on Guidelines Given to
Envoys, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/7257 (Dec. 10, 1999) (noting the comments of
Secretary-General Kofi Annan). According to a recent report submitted to the GA by
the Secretary-General, the guidelines for mediators were revised in 2006. See U.N.
Secretary-General, Strengthening the Role of Mediation in the Peaceful Settlement of
Disputes, Conflict Prevention and Resolution: Report of the Secretary General, 6, U.N.
Doc. A166/811 (June 25, 2012) (emphasizing the role of mediation in settlement
disputes).
202.
PRISCILLA HAYNER, CTR. FOR HUMANITARIAN DIALOGUE & THE INT'L CTR.
FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, NEGOTIATING JUSTICE: GUIDELINES FOR MEDIATORS 20

(2009).
203.
See id. at 21 (emphasizing that the mediator should provide clear guidance
to parties).
204.
See World Bank Operational Manual, Operational Policy (OP) 4.01 (Jan.
1999) (rev'd Apr. 2013), http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/
EXTPOLICIES/EXTOPMANUAL/,,contentMDK:20064724-menuPK:64701637-pageP
K:64709096-piPK:64709108-theSitePK:502184,00.html [http://perma.cc/3DV3-RMH3]
(archived Sept. 29, 2014) (describing the environmental assessment process); see also
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The European Union, too, has adopted development aid policies that
emphasize the importance of civil society participation in decision
making relating to development projects. 205 Although these policies
do not refer explicitly to peace-induced development projects, they
may have an influence on the design of various arrangements during
negotiations, including refugee return or resettlement programs, excombatants reintegration schemes, and plans for the development of
shared natural resources.
As we can see, the scope of existing organizational peacemaking
guidelines is still quite limited and covers only a fraction of the
human rights concerns associated with peace processes. Inclusion of a
larger set of human rights commitments within organizational codes
of conduct and the adoption of such codes by other organizations that
regularly assume peace-facilitating roles can be crucial for the
protection of human rights in peace processes. This is especially true
in view of the complexity of more formal international lawmaking
processes such as treaty-making and the promulgation of
international organization resolutions.
D. NationalForeignAssistance Guidelines
Finally, states that often engage in peace-facilitating tasks can
adopt domestic laws, guidelines, and policies addressing human
rights issues in peace processes. The main global financial aid
provider, the United States, has long been formally linking foreign
aid to the human rights policies and performance of recipient
countries, and so have done other prominent donor countries. This
strategy, although not always rigorously implemented, 20 6 has had
some influence on the human rights norms and practices of recipient
states in such areas as trafficking of women, freedom of speech, and
refugee protection. 207 Adoption by the United States and other
facilitator states of foreign policy guidelines directly addressing
World Bank Operational Manual, Operational Policy (OP) 4.10, 4.12, 4.20 (discussing
investment projects relating to indigenous people).
205.
See The European Consensus on Development art. 4.3, Feb. 24, 2006,
O.J. (C46) 1 (encouraging all sectors of civil society to partake in dialogue advancing
democracy, human rights, and social justice).
206.
See, e.g., Clair Apodaca & Michael Stohl, United States Human Rights
Policy and Foreign Assistance, 43 INT'L STUD. Q. 185 (1995) (asserting that in the
United States, human rights played a role in the allocation of foreign aid during the
Carter, Reagan, and Bush administrations, but not during the Clinton administration);
Eric Neumayer, Do Human Rights Matter in Bilateral Aid Allocation? A Quantitative
Analysis of 21 Donor Countries, 84 SOc. SCI. Q. 650 (2003) (arguing that contrary to
their verbal commitment, donor countries do not consistently reward respect for human
rights in their foreign aid allocation).
207.
See Janie Chuang, The United States as Global Sheriff. Using Unilateral
Sanctions to Combat Human Trafficking, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 437 (2006) (noting that
the linkage of U.S. foreign aid to states' struggle against human trafficking has had
tremendous influence on domestic anti-trafficking worldwide).
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peacemaking assistance of various kinds (financial, diplomatic, etc.)
may similarly have a positive effect on the human rights practices of
negotiating governments.
E. The Role of Facilitatorsin Developing PeacemakingNorms
This Part described four potential sources of peacemaking
norms: treaty provisions, IO resolutions, organizational codes of
conduct, and national foreign assistance guidelines. For reasons
explained above, I asserted that the two latter-which represent a
form of self-regulation by facilitator states and organizations-are
more feasible than the two former, at least in the near future. This
assertion supports the main thesis of this Article, namely, that the
road to achieving just peace agreements passes through third party
facilitators. For as it appears, negotiating countries are not only
likely to downplay human rights considerations in the course of
negotiations, they are also unlikely to create for themselves ex ante
incentives (in the form of explicit international peacemaking norms)
to behave differently. Third party facilitators, by contrast, can be
more realistically expected to both develop human rights norms for
peace processes and ensure their implementation.
It is noteworthy that although they may be viewed as selfregulating measures, facilitators' 'internal' codes and policies
indirectly create peacemaking norms applicable to negotiators. In this
sense, and even though soft international norms are generally
understood to constrain state discretion to a lesser degree than hard
norms, reliance on facilitators' internal standards might exacerbate
the self-determination problems associated with the international
regulation of peacemaking for it entails that negotiators will be
required to subject their peacemaking discretion to various norms in
whose formulation they did not even take part. Even if the bulk of
these norms are of procedural nature, they still have costs that are
harder to justify when negotiators are alienated from the relevant
decision-making process. To somewhat mitigate this democratic
deficit, organizational codes of conduct and foreign assistance policies
should be formulated, to the extent possible, after consultation with
potentially
affected
governments
and
with
civil
society
representatives. It is also important that they be publicized and made
accessible to all parties, a basic requirement of good governance that
the above mentioned UN Secretary General Guidelines for Envoys,
for example, fails to satisfy.
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VII. CONCLUSION
This study seeks to establish, delineate, and attach concrete
legal meaning to the human rights responsibilities of third-party
peace facilitators. It contends that these responsibilities can be based
on a humanity-oriented conceptualization of the principle of state
sovereignty, which asserts that governments have a primary
responsibility to protect the human rights of their citizens as well as
a secondary responsibility to protect the human rights of non-citizens
if the latter's own governments fail to do so. This secondary
responsibility extends beyond the currently acknowledged duties of
states toward non-citizens and applies, inter alia, to peace-induced
human rights violations.
This Article suggests that peace facilitators should be selected to

discharge the international community's collective responsibility to
prevent peace-induced human

rights violations in view of their

potential contribution to such violations and their special ability to
prevent them. The human rights responsibilities of peace facilitators,
however, are not unlimited. When translating these responsibilities
into concrete legal obligations, international lawmakers must balance
them against facilitators' primary duty to protect their own
populations. Lawmakers should also take into account the need to
allow negotiators and facilitators sufficient maneuvering space to
reach a peace agreement as well as the need to respect the external
self-determination of countries undergoing transition from war to

peace.
It is important to note that in order to make a difference, the
theoretical ideas and legal reforms suggested in this Article do not
have to be translated into a comprehensive legal corpus of
peacemaker duties. This discussion can well make a contribution to
the justice and sustainability of peace agreements if it informs some
of the laws and practices of major peace facilitators, or even if it
merely serves to instigate a much-needed academic and policy
discussion on facilitators' human rights responsibilities. In particular,
it can help place peace processes on the radar of the "responsibility to
protect" movement, and it can also fill an important gap in the
theoretical underpinnings of this responsibility.

